When the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate grew weaker the distant provinces began to break away. One such provincial dynasty was that of the Tahirids who gained control over Khurasan. During this period, due to the military requirements of the caliphate, induction of a large number of Turkish warriors, slaves and chiefs though allowed the caliphs of Baghdad to gain a little respite nevertheless further accelerated the process of decay, when these mercenary warriors began to seize power for themselves. Sometimes later the Tāhirids grew weaker. In Kirman and Sistan Yaqūb ibn Layth Saffārī (d. 879 A. C.) finally usurped power. In Khurasan the Sâmānids gained control, with Bukhara as their capital in the third century Hijrah, Their “power extended from the Jaxartes to Baghdad and from Khvarizm and the Caspian Sea to the borders of India”. By the middle of the tenth century one of the Turkish slave-chiefs (later manumitted), Alaptīgîn (d. 963), became very powerful in the Sâmānīd kingdom and seized control over Balkh and Khurasan. In 961 the death of Amīr Abd al-Malik Sâmâni resulted in a war of succession. Alaptīgîn, unfortunately, sided with the losing candidate and subsequently had to retreat to some safer place. He came towards Ghaznih and wrested it from its ruler. Abū Bakr Lawīk. The Lawīks, after some unsuccessful attempts to recover Ghaznih sought help from Jaipal, the ruler of Kabul and western Panjāb. In 977 A. C. Abū ‘Alī s/o Abū Bakr Lawīk with an army led by a son of Jaipal attacked Ghaznih. The city was ably defended by Subuktīgîn a former slave of Alaptīgîn, and a young commander. Abū ‘Alī and the son of Jaipal were captured alive and were executed. This exploit raised the credit of Subuktīgîn who was raised to the throne by unanimous consent of the chiefs and soldiers (27 Sha‘bān 366/20 April 977 A. C.) replacing the incapable Pirītīgîn. The new amīr became the ruler of Ghaznih and inherited conflicts with the Pala rulers and links with the decadent Sâmānīds which were finally settled by his son and successor Maḥmūd.

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1 For Footnotes see Turkish translation.
The successive military expeditions of Sultan Mahmūd had led to the extension and consolidation of the Ghaznavid power in India. These successful campaigns were significant historical events, not only of those times but of all times. Indeed, they change the course of history in the Subcontinent. Same modern writers have satisfied themselves by accusing Sultan Mahmūd of aggression, — even of fanaticism and iconoclasm. Such a subjective judgement is obviously due to their one-sided view of the Sultan’s character and their partial evaluation of the course of history. It is to be recognized that Sultan Mahmūd was a great military genius and a great conqueror in history. He had fought relentlessly and successfully, and extended the orbit of his empire as much to the north in Khorasan, Seistan, Iran and Khawarizm, as to the south in the Subcontinent. But so far as his southern campaigns into the Subcontinent were concerned, it was not Sultan Mahmūd who had initiated the conflict. Jaipal’s aggressive warfare, was the more immediate cause though the genesis of the Indic-Turkic conflict lay in the centuries old ethno-political perspective of the frontier regions.

THE GREAT FRONTIER CONFLICT

Throughout the long past, Tūrān or Turk-Land had constituted a massive ethno-political buffer between the Iranian peoples to the northwest and the Indic stocks to the south-east. Up to the 7th / 8th centuries A. D., the different Turkish stocks had retained their ethnic identity in their own areas of occupation, within their own states and principalities. Extending from east to west in the upper northern belt (present Afghanistan) were the three kingdoms of Zābul or Zābulistān, Kabul or Kābulistān, and Bāmiyān. Running parallel to these in the southern belt (present Baluchistan, in Pakistan) were the principalities of Kot-Pāyah, Tūrān, Kīkān or Kīkānān, and Būqān.

Frontier conflicts are a fact of history, and these also took place in the vast Turko-Indic frontiers. As recorded in Mujmal al-Tawārīkh, the Iranian emperor Bahman Ardshir had once arbitrated and founded the city of Kandābil (ancient Gandava, in the Kachchi district of Baluchistan) “to demarcate the boundary between the Indians and the Turks.”¹ Thus, the conflict might have been set at rest in the southern belt of the frontiers, but further in the northern sector, the Turk Shāhs of Kabul had gradually extended their dominions up to the Indus with Waihind (classical ‘Udabanda, Ohind, modern Hund’) as their winter capital. According to
the tradition recorded by al-Biruni, Barhâtigîn was the first Shah of Kabul ('Kabulshah') who founded the Turk-Shâhî dynasty and, thereafter, the Turk Shâhs contended to rule there for the next sixty generations. Lagturman was the last of them whose rule was subverted by his Brahman minister, Kallar by name. Kallar then usurped the throne for himself and his house, and some of those ruled after the "usurper are named in the tradition as Samand, Kamalu, Bhim, Jaipal, Anandpâl and Tarojanpâl.2 As Biruni appears to have understood it, the event took place in Kabul which then became the capital of the Brahman kings. It is, however, doubtful if after subverting the sixty generations of rule of the Turk Shâhs, the Brahman rulers could continue for long in the midst of the overwhelmingly Turkish population. The date of this important event reflecting the underlying ethno-political conflict is also not known, but possibly it took place much earlier in view of the fact that there is no mention of any Brahman/Hindu ruler of Kabul in the contemporary records of the early Islamic history beginning from the 7th century A. C.3 However that may be, some modern writers on history have been laid to conjecture that possibly Kallar dethroned Lagturman by about 850 A. C.4 By this reckoning, the Brahman subversion of the Turkish Shah had taken place within a period of less than fourteen decades before the long drawn battles were fought between Brahman ruler Jaipal and the Turkish leader Subuktigin.

GHANZAWID-PĂLA CONFLICT: THE NEW PHASE

The age old Indo-Turkic frontier conflict was given a new lease of life by Jaipal's ambitious invasion of the Ghaznih territories at a time when the power and authority of Subuktigin was still weak. After the Ghaznih state became powerful under Sultan Maḥmûd, Jaipal's encounters with him proved to be ineffective. And yet, Jaipal and his successors persisted in their policy of antagonism towards Ghaznih and missed all opportunities for compromise and lasting peace. When the conflict prolonged, Sultan Maḥmûd faced it resolutely and carried it to its logical conclusion during his long rule of 33 years. Not only his direct adversaries, the rulers of the Pâla dynasty,5 were vanquished and their entire territories annexed, but those who had supported them and sided with them were also punished and subjugated. This new phase of Ghaznavid-Pâla conflict expanded through chain reaction and engulfed the vast territories from the banks of the Indus to the Ganges Doab, from the Pâla capital of Waihind to the Pratihara capital of Qannawj.
It would appear that Jaipal invaded Ghaznih in 363 H. (973 A. C.) when it was being ruled by Pirigín, but he was defeated by commander Subuktigin. Therefore when Subuktigin became the ruler of Ghaznih in 366/977, he lost no time in subjecting the frontiers between himself and Jaipal to strategic attacks in order to foil Jaipāl’s plans for further expansion. To this Jaipal reacted much more aggressively. Considering himself too powerful to be challenged by the newly established Turkish ruler of Ghaznih, he did not confine himself to defending the frontiers but made special preparations to invade and destroy Subuktigin in Ghaznih.

It was in 376 (986/87) that Jaipal advanced with a powerful army, crossed Lamaghan and marched against Ghaznih. Subuktigin, with his 15 year old son Mahmūd on his side, met the invading army near the Ghu-zak hill in between Ghaznih and Lamaghan. A fierce battle was fought in which young Mahmūd also made a mark by his persisted onslaughts. As the tables were about to turn against Jaipāl, he sued for peace promising to pay an indemnity of ten lac dirhams and 50 elephants and also to cede some forts and towns adjoining the Ghaznih frontier. Subuktigin agreed and made peace on these terms though young Mahmūd was in favour of carrying on the war until Jaipāl’s agression was beaten once for all. However, Subuktigin brought the war to a halt trusting that Jaipāl would honour his commitments and peace will prevail on the frontiers.

This, however, did not happen. As soon as Jaipāl returned to his territory, he repudiated the treaty and imprisoned the officers of Subuktigin whom the latter had sent to take charge of the ceded forts and towns. Subuktigin first discounted the reports to that effect in view of his having trusted Jaipāl, but when the facts were confirmed he marched and captured Lamaghan and other towns. But instead of counter attacking in Lamaghan or on frontiers, Jaipāl pursued his own plans to defeat and destroy Subuktigin once for all. To this end, he mustered a huge army of one hundred thousand strong, sought support from others and organized a sort of league of the neighbouring Hindu rulers, and “marched on Ghazni at the head of a great host which is said to have been swelled to the enormous number of 100,000 cavalry and infantry by the contingents furnished by the rājās of Northern India.” In this battle, Subuktigin adopted the strategy of attacking this concentrated huge army by a large number of his comparatively smaller divisions, each 500 strong, the one relieving the other by turn, and finally falling upon the tired and bewildered enemy in their full combined strength. Thus, he inflicted a crush-
ing defeat on Jaipâl and routed him completely. Now the whole country from Lamaghan to the interior of Jaipâl's kingdom lay open to him. Jaipâl again begged for peace in return for payment of heavy tribute and also ceding his territory from Lamaghan to Peshawar. Subuktîgin once more agreed and spared Jaipâl to continue to rule his kingdom on his own Indian side. This battle, fought in 378/988 or soon thereafter when Sultan Mahmûd was about 17 years old, became decisive in the trial of strength between Jaipâl and Subuktîgin. Also it marked a turning point in the history of the age-old ethno-political conflict on the vast frontiers between the Turkish and the Indian sides. Though his name is not specifically mentioned, Mahmûd undoubtedly fought alongside his father as he had done in the previous battle when he was two years younger. He had seen how his victorious father had entered into treaties with Jaipâl who only violated them unscrupulously. Jaipâl was still the ruler of a vast kingdom extending from Peshawar to the confines of Lahore and he could prove to be a formidable foe. Above all, this battle had revealed for the first time that it was not only Jaipâl who was to be contended with but a host of other rulers who had sided with him. Sultan Mahmud, with his farsightedness and the military genius in him, could see the danger that was inherent in the situation. Therefore, on having secured his throne after his father's death (Sha'ban 387/August 997), he planned a long-term military strategy to lead expeditions, one after another, in order to keep the Indian Front under constant military pressure. A reference to his resolve to this effect recorded by historian 'Utbî has been interpreted by some modern writers as if the Sultan had vowed it to invade the Indian territories every year.

EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE INDO-GHAZNAVID DOMINIONS

With Sultan Mahmûd's successful expeditions and conquests, from Peshawar-Waihind in the North to the Ganges valley in the South-East and Gujarat in the South-West, not only extended his power considerably but the newly established Indo-Ghaznavid dominions were also consolidated and strengthened.

As a great military leader and conqueror, and as a strong administrator, Sultan Mahmûd gradually extended his authority deep into the interior of the Subcontinent. There is no evidence to show that just in his zeal he had hurried with his Indian conquests. In fact, Khurasan and Central
Asia had remained his main concern though he lost no opportunity to undertake campaigns southward whenever the circumstances so required. In some of the modern writings, the number of the sultan's Indian expeditions has been inflated on the basis of mere place names mentioned in different accounts (as if each place name indicated a separate expedition). Elliot and Dawson who set the fashion of seeking out such place names from all possible sources, even from the works written six centuries later, also attempted to fix the number of expeditions "of that ferocious and insatiable conqueror" (according to them), and they satisfied themselves by stretching this number to seventeen. But even in Tārikh Yamini of 'Utbī, the number of such place names hardly goes beyond twelve or thirteen. Of these also, at least two expeditions were undertaken against the Muslim kingdom of Multan. Thus, beginning from 391/92 H. up to 416 H., that is during a period of about 26 years, the Sultan had intermittently, and not every year, embarked upon possible ten 'full fledged' campaigns in the Subcontinent.16 But he did not invade the Hindu kingdoms alone; he had also attacked and subjugated the Muslim rulers of Qusdar, Multan and Sind with an equal resolve.

The Sultan centred his attention first on settling the score with Jaipāl, the avowed adversary of Ghaznih. After a successful border campaign in Shawwāl 391 (September, 1001) in which the Sultan occupied some frontier forts, he marched against Jaipāl with full force and utterly routed him in the battle of Peshawar on the 8th of Muharram 392 H. (November 1001 A.C.). Jaipāl was captured and imprisoned. From Peshawar, the Sultan proceeded against Waihind, the capital of the Pāla Dynasty, spent that winter there and subjugated the whole country up to the Indus. Jaipāl was released on payment of heavy tribute, but it was agreed that he would retain his kingdom beyond the Indus. Jaipāl then returned to his territories but soon died there and was succeeded by his son Anandpal. The Indus became the boundary between his kingdom and the Sultan's domain.

ACTION AGAINST THE INDO-MUSLIM STATES

The expanding threat to Ghaznih from the aggression of the Pāla rulers having been removed, the Sultan turned his attention first to the Indo-Muslim States — viz. the north-westerly regions of the Subcontinent where formerly provincial governors of the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids had ruled, but where long since political fragmentation had taken place
with the weakening of the 'Abbasid caliphate. These were the kingdoms and amirates of Makran, Qusdar (Khuzdar), Sind and Multan, and the Raids of Bhâtiya. The rulers of Makran and Qusdar had attempted to align themselves with the powerful rulers of Iran and Turkistan (Buwayhids, Seljuqs and the Khans of Transoxania), while the amîrs of Mansura (Sind) and Multan had come under the adverse influence of the sectarian propaganda of the Qarmathian and the Druzian infiltrators but more so under the sectarian-cum-political influence of the Fâtimid agents. As Sultan Maḥmûd had received recognition as a sovereign ruler from the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Qâdirbillâh (381-422 H.) of Baghdad in 389 H. (999 A. C.), he was naturally concerned with the anti-Abbasid sectarian forces gaining ground next door to Ghaznih. As his father Subuktigîn had already subdued the ruler of Qusdar (Khuzdar), Sultan Maḥmûd led his first expedition against Bhâtiya.

**Subjugation of Bhatiya:** This was the Sultan's first expedition deep into the interior of the Subcontinent. Nazim has referred to the strategic position of Bhatiya guarding the passage from north-west into the rich Ganges valley. This would suggest as if it was an exploratory expedition to reach the Ganges valley via Bhatiya, without passing through Anandpal's kingdom. But the contemporary historian 'Utbi has specifically mentioned it as a "Holy War in Hind" would mean that it was not undertaken only for worldly gains — to defeat an adversary or to conquer one more territory — but to protect the Muslim community or to punish the one who transgressed the laws of Islam. This is just what Bijay Rai the ruler of Bhatiya had most probably done.

In 714 A. C., Muḥammad ibn Qâsim had also proceeded against Bhatiya directly from Aror, the capital of Sind. It was then governed by Dâhar's cousin Kaksa son of Ghandar, a learned and wise man who was known as 'Philosopher of Hind'. He concluded peace with Muḥammad ibn Qâsim whereupon most cordial and friendly relations developed between them. Muḥammad ibn Qâsim took him as his trusted advisor and also assigned him all financial matters with the 'seal of treasury.' Thereafter, Kaksa remained with Muḥammad ibn Qâsim throughout his (northern) campaigns. These references would indicate that probably Kaksa, and the subsequent rulers of Bhatiya as also a sizeable population there, had accepted Islam, and Bhatiya became an integral part of the Al-Sind province of the Caliphate. The country was inhabited predominantly by the ethnic stock of the Bhatis, and those who became Muslims called them-
selves ‘Bhattîs’, a nomenclature that has continued on to this day. However, by the end of the 4th century A. H., the ruling Rai of Bhatiya, Bijay Rai, had probably deviated from Islam and had become oppressive whereupon the Muslim community there appealed to Sultan Mahmûd for help. The fact that the Sultan marched against Bhatiya directly from Sistan while he was campaigning there, without first returning to Ghaznîh, indicates that he was responding to an urgent call for help. He lost no time and proceeded from Bust in Sistan via Wâlishtân (northern Baluchistan) and crossing the Indus below Multan, he besieged Fort Bhatiya which has been identified by Nazim with Bhattinda. This later form of the name would appear to have gained prominence with its increasing population of the Muslim Bhattîs (Bhattinda = Bhattian + da — of the Bhattîs). Battle raged for three days and Bijay Rai was defeated on the fourth day. According to ‘Utbi, the Sultan stayed over in the Bhatiya country till ‘he had cleansed it’ and appointed teachers to instruct those who had embraced Islam and lead them in the right path. He had left Sistan directly for Bhatiya in October 1004 A. C., and returned from there by about June-July 1005 A. C., during the monsoon rains, thus having spent about six months there during which he not only subjugated the entire country but also rehabilitated the distressed Muslim community.

**Action Against Multan:** Immediately next year in 396 H., Sultan Mahmûd proceeded against Abû’l Fath Dâwûd ibn Naṣr the ruler of Multan, who had come under the influence of the sectarian-cum-political propaganda of the Qarmathian, the Druzian, and the Fâtimid agents.

The Qarmathian heresy, with religious disruption and political subversion as its main objectives, had become widespread in the outlying provinces of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad during the 3rd century A. H. Their heterodox sectarian propaganda was also directed to the easternmost Al-Sind province of the caliphate. The more organized anti-‘Abbasid and pro-Fâtimid propaganda was later directed from Yaman by Abû’l Qâsim known as “Maṣûr al-Yaman” who sent his close relative and agent Haytham to Sind in 270/883. The secret propaganda continued and later on the Fâtimid Caliph al-Mu’izz (341-365/952-975) specially appointed his own trusted agent Jalam ibn Shayban with instructions to eliminate the previous agent, turn the situation to his own advantage and capture Multan. Jalam carried out the plan ruthlessly. He subverted the Banû Munnabbih Dynasty of Multan, usurped power and established himself as ruler of Multan.
This event took place in early 354/965 (or immediately before, in the previous year) as is confirmed by Caliph al-Mu'izz's reply letter dated 'Sunday, the 19th of Ramadan 354 H.' ("11 nights remaining out of Ramadan" as in the original text), complementing Jalam on his successes and recognizing his meritorious services to the Fātimid cause. The Fātimid Caliph's letter which is preserved in Uyūn al-Akhbār, the historical work of Dā'ī 'Imād al-Dīn Idrīs who has observed elsewhere in the same work that Jalam had destroyed temples with the permission of Caliph Mu'izz himself.

These events had taken place just about 40 years before Sultan Mahmūd decided to take action against Dāwūd who had possibly succeeded Jalam. The anti-'Abbāsid influences were also anti Ghaznavid, and this would appear to have encouraged the ruler of Multan to enter into secret alliance with Anandpal who had refused permission to the Sultan to cross the Indus and proceed against Multan through his territories. For a long time, Dāwūd had successfully camouflaged his intrigues by professing friendly relations with Subuktigin and then with Sultan Mahmūd. However, it was during Sultan Mahmūd's expedition against Bhatiya that Dāwūd had probably resented the passage of army through his territories and therefore the Sultan had to follow a more southerly route to and from Bhatiya. According to Ḥibtī, Dāwūd's adherence to the Carmethian heresy was the main cause of the Sultan's invasion of Multan.

In the spring of 396 H. (March-April 1006 A. C.), Sultan Mahmūd marched against Multan from the side of Peshawar, but as the Indus marked the boundary line between his domain and the kingdom of Anandpal, he sought Anandpal's permission to cross the Indus and pass through his territory. Anandpal, being in league with the ruler of Multan, not only refused permission but brought up his army to block the Sultan's passage. However, he was defeated and fled, and the Sultan crossed the Indus and marched straight on to Multan.

Hearing of Anadpal's defeat and flight, Dāwūd withdrew from Multan before the Sultan's arrival and fled to an island in the Indus, which from the point of safe distance and security was most probably that of Bakhar in northern Sind. The garrison left behind by Dāwūd remained fortified but the Sultan captured the fort after a siege of seven days. The innocent citizens pleaded for amnesty which was granted on payment of a
fine of 20,000 dirhams, but the sectarian elements who had supported the usurpers were not pardoned and were put to sword. The sultan then proceeded to subjugate the outlying regions of Multan, but having received the news of the invasion of Khurasan by İlak Khân he left his governor there and hurried back to Ghaznîh. Dâwûd seizing the opportunity, returned sometime thereafter, fomented sectarian disturbances and attempted to re-establish himself in Multan. Hearing of this, the sultan marched against Multan in the beginning of 401 H. (October 1010). This time he subjugated the whole country. Dâwûd was captured and most of his partisans and the sectarian forces were destroyed and others were sent as prisoners to the distant forts. The sultan took Dâwûd to Ghaznîh and probably pursuaded him to eschew sectarian views and Fātimid allegiance, but he does not seem to have agreed. Thereupon he was confined for life in the fort of Ghuzak.

Action against Sind. How far Sind was infected by the early Carmethian intrigues or the subsequent Fātimid propaganda is not known. It would seem that the Habbârî rulers of Mansurah did not succumb to this propaganda so soon as Multan. Had it been so, the sultan would have also taken action against them. The few available references indicate that they owed allegiance to the ‘Abbâsid Caliph of Baghdad and continued to rule after the fall of Multan to the Fātimid agents. Thus, by about 372 H., a Qurayshite (of the Banû Habbârî Dynasty) is mentioned as the ruler of Mansurah; and again three years later in 375 H., Muqaddasî who visited Mansurah had observed that the ruler there was the Qurayshite who read khutbah in the name of the ‘Abbâsid Caliph though the ruler of Multan read khutbah in Fātimid’s name. It was probably after their final defeat in Multan and expulsion from there that the sectarian elements turned to Mansurah and influenced Khafîf, most probably the last Habbârî ruler of Mansurah. Therefore, while returning from the Somnath expedition, the Sultan marched against Mansurah. Khafîf fled, crossed the Indus and took refuge in a date palm forest on the other side. The Sultan’s troops surrounded the forest and Khafîf’s men were killed but he probably survived.

Action against the Jatts: As the Sultan marched from Mansurah northwards, along the Indus, his army was harassed by the “Jatts of Sind” (Jatân-i Sind) and many of the soldiers and beasts of burden perished before the Sultan reached Multan. He continued his onward journey to Ghaznîh but returned to Multan the following year, 418 H.
(March, 1027), as he was much concerned about the behaviour of "the Jutts of Multan, Bhatiya and of the Indus" and mounted a powerful boat flotilla against them and punished them severely.32

Action against Qusdar: With the weakening of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate, Qusdar (Khuzdar, the presente, Central and Southern Baluchistan) had emerged as an independent principality, and Subuktigin was the first to subjugate it by about 367 H. (978/79 H.). He turned it into a dependency of his kingdom of Ghaznīh.33 As the state of Qusdar was strategically situated between Ghaznīh, Khurasan and Sind, its ruler had entered into secret alliance with the Īlāk Khān of Turkistan who intended to attack Khurasan simultaneously with the Qusdar ruler's rebellion against Ghaznīh.34 Accordingly, the Qusdar ruler became hostile and withheld annual tribute whereupon the Sultan marched against him in Jumādah-II 402 H. (December 1011 A. C.) and laid seige to Qusdar. The ruler submitted, paid the tribute, and also delivered fifteen elephants and substantial indemnity in cash. The Sultan then allowed him to retain his kingdom as a feudatory chieftain of Ghaznīh.35

Makran (which then included within its boundaries the present western part of Baluchistan in Pakistan and the south-eastern part of Iran) had also become independent with the weakening of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate. Later on, it became a dependency of the Buwayhids of Iran. With the rise of the Ghaznawīds and the decline of the Buwayhids, Ma'dān, the ruler of Makran transferred his allegiance to Subuktigin and then to Sultan Mahmūd.36 Thereafter Makran continued to remain a peaceful dependency, faithful to Sultan Mahmūd throughout his reign.37

CONQUEST OF THE PĀLA KINGDOM

Already mentioned, the great frontier conflict had culminated in the defeat of Jaipāl and Sultan Mahmūd had recognised the Indus as the dividing line between the two sides. To avoid any further conflict with Anandpal, the Sultan had followed a more southerly route on his earlier expedition to Bhatiya. But Anandpal continued to entertain enmity towards the Sultan, so that when the Sultan wanted to take prompt action against the ruler of Multan and sought Anandpal's permission to cross the Indus and pass through his territory to Multan, he not only refused the request but brought up his army to block the Sultan's passage, as stated earlier. This ruined the prospects of any further understanding and
accommodation. In the battle that ensued, Sultan Mahmūd defeated Anandpal who fled before him and turned northwards into the Kashmir hills to avoid being overtaken. The Sultan, however, did not pursue him and marched away straight to Multan. Even after the Multan expedition, the Sultan did not take any punitive action against Anandpal. It would appear that the Sultan wished to leave him in peace in his territories beyond the Indus.

**Battle of Nagarkot:** Gaining advantage of the peaceful interlude of three years, Anandpal prepared to muster his strength in order to invade Peshawar. Not only he collected his forces from all over his kingdom but also sought support from the powerful Hindu rulers of Qannawī, Kalinjar, Gwalior and others who readily responded to his call. Whether the huge army was prepared jointly by all the rulers in league with one another, or they gave their individual support to Anandpal, the Sultan’s intelligence must have sized up the situation to the conclusion that not only Anandpal but a host of his supporters beyond were to be contended with. This was more probably the turning point in the Sultan’s policy towards Anandpal and other rulers beyond the confines of the Hindu Shāhīyah kingdom.

Anandpal had collected a huge army and concentrated it at Nagarkot near Kangra. There he put it under the command of his son Brahmanpal to march against Peshawar. When the Sultan received the intelligence of the impending attack, he lost no time and marched post-haste from Ghaznih on the 29th of Rabi-Il, 399 (the turn of December 1008 A. C.) despite the severity of mid-winter. He took the lead, crossed the Indus first and marched ahead to meet the invading army stationed in the plain opposite Waihind. By the Sultan’s resolute stand and superior strategy, Anandpal was utterly routed. The victorious forces pursued the defeated hosts to Nagarkot which stood on the spur of a hill encircled by the river Banganga. This stronghold was captured after a siege of three days and much booty, including the decorated throne of Raja Bhīm of the Pandava Dynasty, fell into the hands of the Sultan who appointed his officer there and returned to Ghaznih by the end of 399 H. (June 1009 A. C.).

**Battle of Nandana.** After the fall of Nagarkot, Anandpal shifted his capital to Nandana in the Salt Range, where he died and was succeeded by his son Tarojanpal (Trilochanpal). Nandana with its formidable fort was strategically situated, from where Tarojanpal could successfully block
the Sultan’s passage to the plains of Jhelum and onwards to Multan. The Sultan left Ghaznih by the end of autumn 404 H. (November 1013) but had to turn back due to heavy snow fall. He marched against Nandana in the next spring (March 1014). In the meantime, Tarojanpal entrusted the defence of Nandana to his son Bhimpal and he himself left for the ‘Kashmir Pass’ (the Lower Lahorian Valley) to seek assistance from the ruler of Kashmir. While the Sultan assaulted the fort, Bhimpal received reinforcement, came down the fort with his numerous army and array of elephants and attacked, but was beaten back. As the battle continued Bhimpal fled, and the Sultan’s forces besieged the fort and the garrison there also capitulated. The Sultan then proceeded in pursuit of Tarojanpal who, along with a Kashmirian contingent commanded by Tunga, had taken up his position in a valley, north of Jhelum. As the Sultan’s forces launched attack, Tunga fled for life and so also Tarojanpal.

With the capture of Nandana, tароjanpal’s territories between the Indus and the Jhelum came under the Ghaznavid rule. This became the second province of the Indo-Ghaznavid dominions, after the first one of Peshawar-Waihind. The Sultan appointed Sārūgh, an able officer, as his governor at Nandana which now became the provincial capital. The news of the Sultan’s victory at Nandana had great impact: many of the neighbouring chiefs and rulers tendered their fealty to the Sultan and a large number of people embraced Islam. The Sultan appointed teachers to instruct the people in Islam and also ordered mosques to be built all over the country. He returned to Ghaznih in the summer of 405 A. H. (July-August 1014).39

Battle of Thanesar. No record is available of Tarojanpal’s whereabouts following his defeat near Jhelum. Long back, boundaries of the Pāla kingdom had been extended by Jaipāl as far as the Biyas river in the east, by conquering the kingdom of Rājah Chandardat of Lahore (999 A. C.). He then appointed his son Anandpal as his governor there (1002/1003).40 From Lahore as his provincial capital, Anandpal would appear to have extended his power further east by subjugating the kingdoms of Thanesar, Sharwā and Sirsāwa. As such, Tarojanpal’s dominions extended far beyond the Jhelum River, and he must have crossed the river to make himself safe and secure, though probably being hotly pursued by the Sultan’s forces he did not hold to Lahore and betook himself to Thanesar. Thus, one more province with Lahore as its capital was added to the Ghaznavid dominions.
Before Tarojanpal could muster his strength, Sultan Mahmūd mounted his expedition against Thanesar in October 1014 (405 H), almost immediately after his return from Nandana. Tarojanpal sued for peace and offered to deliver 50 elephants to the Sultan if he would not attack Thanesar. But the Sultan did not trust Tarojanpal any more, and marched straight on to Thanesar and stormed the city. The Raja of Thanesar had fled on the Sultan’s approach and so did Tarojanpal.

Thus, Tarojanpal’s power was finally broken within the limits of the Pāla Kingdom and, to that extent, conflict between him and the Sultan came to an end. It has been said that after his defeat near Jhelum Tarojanpal “retired to the eastern part of Punjab where he seems to have established himself in the Siwalik hills.” Presumably he did so after fleeing from Thanesar where he had attempted to establish himself had the Sultan not attacked him there.

But even as he moved ahead in adverse circumstances, Tarojanpal did not rest in peace due to his impetuous and intriguing nature, and carried on warfare with the neighbouring rājas. For sometime he was in conflict with the rai of Sharwā, probably intending to hold Sharwā for himself. Later on he entered into alliance with Rajah Ganda of Kalinjar and possibly also revised his contacts with Rijyapal, the Pratihara ruler of Qannawj. Only a decade earlier (in 399-1008), the rulers of Qannawj, Kalinjar and others had despatched their troops to Tarojanpal’s father Anandpal enabling him to rise against Sultan Mahmūd and invade Peshawar. Therefore in view of Qannawj’s antagonism, but more so due to Tarojanpal’s intrigues, the Sultan now turned his attention to Qannawj and Sharwā.

BATTLES IN THE GANGES DOAB

Leaving Ghaznih on 13 Jumādah-I, 409 H. (27 September 1018) and marching along the sub-Himalayan range, the Sultan crossed the River Jumna on 20 Rajab 409 (December, 1018) and took Sirsāwa by assault. Then he reached Baran (Bulandshahr) where Rājah Hardat offered submission and embraced Islam with ten thousand of his followers. The Sultan then proceeded against Mahaban and defeated Rājah Kulchand there. Advancing further he took Muthra and ultimately arrived at Qannawj on the 8th of Sha‘ban, 409 (20 December 1018), where Rajyapal did not offer any resistance, vacated the city, crossed the Ganges and betook himself to Bari. The Sultan did not pursue him there, but turned his attention to
Sharwa where Tarojanpal was desperately active. After taking the forts of Munja and Asai, the Sultan attacked Sharwa. Râjah Chandar Ray who had aligned himself with Tarojanpal and given his daughter in marriage to his son Bhimpal was defeated (25 Sha’ban 409/6 January 1019), and he fled to hills.

The Sultan left Chandar Ray alone and returned to Ghaznih, but the Sharwâ ruler’s defeat did not put an end to Tarojanpal’s anti-Ghaznavid activities. He now intrigued with Râjah Ganda of Kalinjar who promised to help him to wrest his ancestral territories from Sultan Mahmûd. Ganda had his own ambition to occupy a position of supremacy vis-a-vis the rai of Qannawj. The raja of Gavalior and other chiefs joined hands with Ganda and accused Rajyapal of Qannawj for not resisting the Sultan. On this pretext, they attacked him and he was slain. They then raised to the throne of Qannawj a certain Trilochanpal (supposed to be a son or near relative of Rajyapal) who had probably demonstrated his antagonism against Sultan Mahmûd. These events impelled the Sultan to take prompt action against them.

Accordingly, the Sultan marched from Ghaznih in the beginning of the autumn of 410 H. (October 1019), crossed the Ganges below Hardwar, and had his first encounter with Tarojanpal (14 Sha’ban 419/15 December 1019) on the banks of the river Rahut or Ramganga. Thereafter, he pursued him to the other side of the river and inflicted a crushing defeat on him. Tarojanpal was wounded but escaped. The few of his loyal troops whom he had dragged on with him for more than a decade got rid of him by assassinating him later (412/1021-22). His son Bhimpal died five years later (417/1026), and thus ended the prolonged Pâla-Ghaznavid conflict which had compelled the Sultan to undertake his present as well as previous expeditions. However, Raja Ganda and his supporters — the newly invested Rai Trilochanpal of Qannawj and Bari and Râjah Arjan of Kalinjar — were still to be contended with. But after having vanquished Tarojanpal, the avowed enemy of the Ghaznavids, Sultan Mahmûd probably intended to reconcile the other Hindu rajas. Though, no specific references to this effect are on record, the submission of the Rajah of Baran or evacuation of Qannawj by Rajyapal without offering resistance, might have been influenced by the Sultan’s earlier diplomatic moves. Now that Tarojanpal had been finally vanquished, the Sultan also intended to reconcile Ganda. Advancing to Kalinjar, the Sultan sent his ambassador to him offering him either to conclude peace and pay tribute,
or accept Islam and rule independently. Ganda rejected the offer and threatened war, relying upon the huge army that he had collected. Thereupon, the Sultan made full preparations and prostrated himself to pray for Divine assistance for victory. The next day, once again the Sultan despatched his ambassador to Rājah Ganda hoping that better counsel would prevail with him. In the meanwhile, however, Ganda had lost his nerve, deserted his camp and fled. The ambassador returned to report that the enemy’s camp was deserted, whereupon the camp was ransacked and some of the fleeing troops were captured, but Ganda made good his escape. The Sultan did not pursue him any further and returned to Ghazni. For next three years he took no action against Ganda and his supporters, hoping that they would not persist in their anti-Ghaznavid moves. Such a hope, however, did not materialise due to Ganda’s continued intrigue and opposition. Thereafter in (413/1022) the Sultan again marched against Ganda and his feudatory Arjan, the ruler of Gwalior.

Battle of Gwalior. First the Sultan attacked Gwalior, and though he could not capture it due to stiff resistance, Raja Arjan was so much alarmed by the Sultan’s powerful assault that he made a present of 35 elephants to the Sultan and sued for peace which was granted. From there, the Sultan advanced against Kalinjar and laid siege to the fort and blocked all approaches to it. Thereupon, Ganda also sued for peace on payment of an annual tribute besides the immediate delivery of 300 elephants. When the Sultan accepted these terms and raised the siege, Ganda composed a verse in Hindi in praise of Sultan Mahmūd who was so pleased that he conferred on Raja Ganda the government of fifteen forts, a role of honour and rich presents. The Sultan returned to Ghazni from this expedition by the close of the year 413 H. (March - April 1023).

THE SOMNATH EXPEDITION

This expedition was undertaken by the Sultan in 416 H. (AD. 1025) with full preparation but at a great risk as he had to negotiate vast waterless regions where no provisions could become available. It was, indeed, one of the greatest feats of military adventure in history. The strong fort of Somnath and the temple in it were taken on 16 Dhū al-Qa‘dah 416 H. (January 1026). The compulsions behind this expedition are not known. The contemporary Muslim historians have seen it as an expedition against idolatry. They fancied Somnath to be originally the Manāt’ idol brought over from Arabia and planted on the seashore of kathiawan
under cover of coastal tides. According to the Hindu legend quoted by Al-Birûnî (ii: 102-3), it symbolized the linga of Mahadev and it was believed that with the rhythm of ebb and tide, the moon (Som Nath = The Moon Lord) was perpetually engaged in serving and bathing the idol. As an object of worship, either as Manat or as Lingum, it could hardly evoke any admiration from a unitarian like Sultan Maḥmūd. However, as recorded by contemporary Muslim authors, some extravagant stories had gained currency about the powers of Somnath Idol. Accordingly, the Hindus believed that the idol possessed divine powers, and that it gave life and death. “When Yamīnu’d-Dawlah (Maḥmūd) was gaining victories and demolishing temples in India, the Hindus said that Somnath was displeased with these idols, and that if it had been satisfied with them no one could have destroyed or injured them. When Yamīnu’d-Dawlah heard this, he resolved upon making a campaign to destroy this idol.”45 Such tales, then in wide circulation, are likely to have influenced the Sultan’s decision to break the idol in order to break the myth of its power and set at rest the whispering campaign.

Focussing all attention on the destruction of the idol as being the sole objective of the Sultan’s expedition has, however, submerged the historical reality of this event. Somnath was not only an idol temple, but a city with a strong fort and also a port of call for the ships sailing on the international ocean highway between the Middle East and China. As it was frequented by ships laden with rich merchandise, sea pirates with their places of refuge on the Gujrat-Kathiawar-Cutch coastline often raised their head and engaged in loot and plunder. They are likely to have become active during the period of decline of the Arab-Muslim power in Sind, prior to the rise of the Ghaznavids. Muslim merchants from the ports of Arabia, Iraq and Iran which then belonged to the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate were usually the worst sufferers. Prosperity of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate of Baghdad also depended on this maritime trade. Had Somnath temple become a place of refuge for the sea pirates where they deposited treasures? According to local tradition, Muslims were living at Somnath even before it was captured by Sultan Maḥmūd but they were oppressed by the rājah at whose orders a Muslims was slaughtered everyday in front of the idol of Somnath.46 This cannot be literally true, but some events of the bygone times might have given rise to such a legend, and the possibility of the pirates oppressing their rich merchant victims cannot be ruled out. That Sultan Maḥmūd’s storming of Somnath had some strategic and pol-
itical significance is partly borne out of the fact that he received special honours and titles from the Calips of Baghdad. Such titles were not bestowed merely for the destruction of a temple.

THE INDO-GHAZNAVID DOMINIONS UNDER SULTAN MAḤMŪD'S SUCCESSORS

Sultan Maḥmūd died on Thursday, 23rd Rabi‘-II (30 April 1030) after having ruled for 33 years. He was an accomplished military leader and one of the greatest generals in history. Also he was the most vigilant and strict administrator. As a great patron of learning he was very generous to scholars. He was a just and tolerant ruler who attempted to reconcile the Hindus and integrate them under his government and polity. He got his coins minted with legend in Sanskrit, and Hindus were recruited not only in his civil service but also in the army. Hindu divisions with their headquarters in Ghaznih constituted an integral part of the Sultan’s army. Because of his great qualities of leadership both in war and peace, the Sultan was able to build up a vast empire extending “from Iraq and the Caspian Sea to the river Ganges, and from the Aral Sea and Transoxiana to the Indian Ocean.”

During the life-time of Sultan Maḥmūd, the Indo-Ghaznavid territories, directly controlled from Ghaznih, included the entire Peshawar region and the whole of the Punjab, forming four main administrative units or provinces with their capitals at Peshawar, Nandana, Lahore and Multan. The authority of the governor of Lahore had extended beyond East Punjab up to the Ganges Doab including the fort of Kalinjar. It was in Kalinjar that prime minister Khawajah Ahmad ibn Hasan Maymandī was detained during the last years of Sultan Maḥmūd’s reign, and from where he was released when Sultan Masʻūd ascended the throne. These boundaries of the Indo-Ghaznavid dominions were further extended by the peripheral conquests achieved by some of the successors of Sultan Maḥmūd.