

AVICENNA AND “*SIYĀĤA*”

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Before going into any discussions, first of all, the title of this study should be clarified.

The word “*siyāĥa*” is simply “travel” when looked up in the dictionary, but, the reader going through this article should not be confused by gaining any impressions about tourism. In fact, the important philosophical meaning of “*siyāĥa*” can easily be noticed through the article.

Fundamentally, the travel of the soul of man is a matter of fact, but, “*siyāĥa*” is not the travel of the soul of man from one body to another after the death. Because, as it is known, Avicenna refuses the theory of the Soul’s transmigration (The passing of the Soul one body into another at the time of death).¹ The meaning of “*siyāĥa*” is neither the immigration of the Soul or its descent to the corpse during the birth, like “a dove descending from the infinity of the sky”, nor “*hijra*”, *exodus*, the Soul’s emigration from the corpse to which it was exiled, to its own country.

It is known that, “*hijra*”, *exodus* or emigration, has a second meaning, “*hijrān*”, that is, cession, rupture. Avicenna has used the word “*siyāĥa*” in the sense of “*hijrān*”.² From this point of view, “*siyāĥa*” is a term used to indicate the travel of the Soul, neither in the birth, nor after the death, but during the life as the Soul has been wearing its clothes called the “human body”.

During this travel, the Soul of man, certainly, has a direction to take, a goal to reach and means to use. Therefore, this travel has both a beginning and a point of arrival. This travel of the Soul is based on nothing else but the relation between God and the human being.

According to Avicenna, there are three kinds of travels of Soul. The first one is the Soul’s voyage from the sense data to the ideas. The second

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¹ Avicenna, *Shifā*, vol. 4-5, pp. 355-356; *Najā*, pp. 302-310; *Gīta*, (London 1887), pp. 25-26.

² A.M. Goichon, *Le Récit de Hayy ibn Yaqzan. Commenté par des Textes d’Avicenna*, (Paris, D. de Brouwer 1959), p. 232.

one is the voyage from the knowledge about universe to the knowledge about God. The third one is the voyage from the ordinary norms to the norms of “*‘arif mutanazzih*”, one who knows about God for God only.

From this point of view, St. Augustine’s theory about the universal history of man, certainly, has a meaning. According to St. Augustine, the universal history of man is nothing else but a fighting and quarrel between the ones who love God only for God (*Civitas Dei*, Celestial Jerusalem) and the ones who love God for themselves (*Civitas Terrena*, Societä Diabolica).

According to Avicenna, there is a parallelism between these kinds of travels and they are, also, identical when their essences are taken into consideration. The essences of these travels are nothing else but “the worship and contemplation of God” (Aristotle, *E.E.*, 1249, b 20), the self devotion to the God, the piety, the consecration, the salvation of the Soul from the corpse, the “*catharsis*”.³

The fundamental reason of the existence of the conception of the three kinds of travel is the conceptual approach of Avicenna to the meaning of “matter” in three different ways. According to the first approach of Avicenna when a comparison between sense data and ideas is made, the sense data appears to be a more suitable meaning to the concept of “matter”. Needless to say, the sense data is the production of the faculties of sensation and imagination related to the corpse. The second approach is to take the ordinary knowledge as “matter”, when a comparison between the knowledge about God and the ordinary knowledge is made. The third approach is to take the ordinary ethical norms as “matter”, when these norms are compared with the norms of “*‘arif mutanazzih*” who desires the knowledge about God for nothing else but God.

Naturally, during these travels, the Soul has various difficulties; the travels are interrupted by some obligatory stops.

Up to now, an explanatory introduction is made and through the whole text it should be taken into account that the expressions as “*sayr ilä’llâh*” (walking to God), “*sayr bi’llâh*” (walking with God), “*sayr fî’llâh*”

³ *Purifications (Katharoi)*. See, Katleen Freeman, *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Companion to Diels’ Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*; and *Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers*, (London, Blackwell 1959), pp. 172-304.

(walking at God), and the words like “*asfār*” (beginning to travel) and “*sayr u sulūk*” (walking and initiation) will not be used, because, these terms are concerned with “*taṣawwuf*”, the muslim mysticism, and they make the reader deviate from the subject and from the vocabulary of Avicenna.

From a philosophical point of view, a variety of travel are present: From the sense data to the concepts, from the earth to the sky, from the argil to the life, from the plurality to the unity, from the creator to the creature, from the reason to the revelation, from the cave to outside, from the mind to the heart, from the “*tanzīl*” (sending down; divine communication of Qur’an to Prophete Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel; revelation) to “*ta’wīl*” (allegorical interpretation), from the “*ḥakk*” (verity) to the “*ḥalk*” (creation), from the vice to the virtue, from the society to the individuality, from the “*samṣāra*” to the “*mokṣa*”, from the “Terrestrial City” (*Civitas Terrena*) to the “Heavenly City” (*Civitas Dei*), from the “Vicious Society” (*madīnat dāllah*) to the “Virtuous Society” (*madīnat fāḍilah*), etc.

It is also know that, these travels occurred in different ways: Standing near the wall and hearing (Ziusudra the Sumerian King); diving into the sea (Gilgamesh the Sumerian Hero); walking on the ground (Gilgamesh, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Anat, Samson); stepping up the ladder and ascending to the sky (Jacob); mounting a horse or deer (chaman); metamorphosing into a bird; attaching to the “wings of the wind”; sitting into a drop of honey (brahmān); sailing on a “Great Ship” (mahayāna), or on a “Little Ship” (hinayāna); going in a cart (Inanna, Venus of Sumerians) or in the “Sun chariot”; climbing up the “Column of magnificence” (Mani); ascending to the sky through a “ladder of light”; crossing the jungle; taking some drugs; initiating to the cult of Dionysus; achieving the certitude or *apodeictic truth* by means of philosophy, science and art, and making contribution to intellectual culture and civilization.

During these travels, it is inevitable for the travelling “hero” to kill all of the monsters which oppose the progress of the traveller.

It is obvious that, most of the kinds of these travels are described by means of myths, symbols and allegories.⁴ Avicenna has followed the same

⁴ The myth could not indicate anything chimerical when it has only the allegorical and symbolic function. The myth could not in this case, be considered as a “keeper of the primitive creeds”, but, “a fact of adaptation to the spiritual evolution” (Landsberger). Ac-

way of description in his *Risâlat al-Tair* (Treatise of the Bird) and *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân* (The Living Son of the Awake).

Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân of Avicenna has interpretations by Corbin and Goichon; and these interpretations are exactly opposing each other. According to Corbin, Avicenna is nothing else but a mystic-gnostic whose origin is from India and Persia. However, according to Goichon, Corbin's opinions are faraway from the reality. Because, Avicenna exposed in *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân* his own habitual philosophy only by means of allegories. For that reason, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân* is only a *résumé* of Avicenna's philosophical views concerning with the epistemology presented by allegories and symbols. Goichon has based her thesis on using a method of comparison between various groups of Avicenna's work. She compared Avicenna's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân* with his *Risâlat al-Tair*, *Risâlat fî Mâhiyat al-⁶Ishk* (Treatise on Love), *Al-Ishârât wa'l-Tanbîhât* (The Book of Directives and Remarks) and *Najât* (The Book of Deliverance). This is nothing else but to compare Avicenna with Avicenna to comment on *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân*. According to Goichon, Suhrawardî has pretended that Avicenna did not know the ancient Persian sources and did not cited "*al-Tûr al-A⁶zam*" (The sublime Mountain) and "*al-Tâmmat al-Kubrâ*" (The Main Proof); and, therefore, was naturally unsuccessful. Also, according to her, Ibn Zayla, the persian commentator of Avicenna's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân*, has considered this book as an exposition of the habitual philosophy of Avicenna by allegories.⁵

cording to Leo Strauss, there could not be any primitive or prelogical thought (*Anthropologie Structurale*, 1956; *La Pensée Sauvage*, 1962). In order to explain the natural, social and psychological facts, man, could at first, has been able to express his philosophical ideas by means of mythes. Therefore, the symbols used in any myth, corresponds to the relation between universe and society. According to Jacobsen, the myth is nothing else but the representation of the natural forces in the anthropomorphical forms of Gods whose relations are parallel to the psychological states of man. In early time in Mesopotamia, there was mythes to explain the problems of origine, the relations between universe, society and the contrary even contradictory forces in economical life (John Grey, *Near Eastern Mythology*, 1969, p. 26). The Sumerians have been able to conceive the natural mecanism of the world by a procedure other than the logic and the description (Frankfort, *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, Chicago 1946; *Before Philosophy*, 1949). Kramer has considered the myth like an expression of the rational observations and the truths by means of allegories and symbol (*The Sumerians*, Chicago 1963). Kramer and Jacobsen has discussed the subject (Kirk, *Myths. Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Culture*, Yale, Cambridge University of California Press, Los Angeles 1970). See, Alice Lee Stauffer, *The Relation of Ancient Near Eastern Myth to the Ionian Presocratic View of World and Earth*, 1985, University of New Mexico (Doctoral Thesis).

⁵ Goichon, *ibid*, Avant Propos.

Goichon has cited the main sources to which Avicenna makes reference, such as Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Ptolemy, the Stoics, the Semites, the ancient Persia, Babylon and Chaldea, Al-Ḳur'ân and Alfarabius (Al-Fârâbî).

Let us notice two points which Goichon and Corbin have neglected. One of these points is that: The main points of the Sumerian wisdom are not cited. The other is the following: It is known that Avicenna has composed his *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzân* when he was a prisoner in the castle of Fardajan. It is likely that Avicenna had to prepare his work which was, like Plato's *Phaido*, in conditions similar to those of Boethius who has written *Consolatio Philosophiae* which was also composed in prison. According to Boethius, one could reach the ultimate happiness only by salvation from all sorts of impurities, like the corpse, the obscurity, the ignorance and the vice. Also, according to Avicenna, the wisdom is the "Source of Life" (*Yanbû^c al-Ḥayât=Fons Vitae*). The paraphraser of Alfarabius *De Intellectu et Intellecto*, Bedersi, was, his *Be'hinath^c olâm* (Examination of the World),⁶ in the same way with Boethius.

According to Avicenna, one could not reach the salvation from the obscurities of the horrible desert of salt, which means ignorance, unless he drinks the sweet and clear water of logic and philosophy flowing on the isthmus which extends between the world of sensibility and the intelligence. This is the way of life for salvation of the Pythagoreans who believe in "*Sôma Sêma*". They devote themselves to the philosophy, science and art in order to break the "wheel of life". This is also to reach the Sumerian King Ziusudra who is believed to save all of the creatures from the deluge and to ignore the Persian Ruler (Quoted by Avicenna in the end of his *Risâlat fî Mâhiyat al-^cIshk*) who has put Avicenna in prison and who knows very little about "*imitatio Dei*". As a result, this is the eternity of philosophy, "*sapientia perennis*", "*al-ḥikma al-ḥâlida*", "*jâwidân ḥirad*" and "*kutatgu bilig*" (wisdom of royal glory).

Now it is the time to remember the main points concerning with the relations between Man and God in the wisdom of Sumerians and Chaldeans on which Avicenna's three "*siyâḥa*"s are based.

For Sumerians, there is a parallelism in structure between Gods, universe, society and man. It is the Sumerians who have put to order and

⁶ S. Munk, *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*, (Paris, Vrin 1955), p. 496.

classified everything in the universe by depending on the concept of justice, principle of all things. The justice appears to be as “*Nam*” (Laws of nature) in the universe and as “*Me*”s (the rules and regulations devised by the Gods to make the cosmos run smoothly and effectively) or as “*paršu*” (*fard*, the laws of society) so that the ones who have lost their justice also lose their existence. Man must be yielding and obedient to the “*Me*”s. If the king loses his justice, he will also lose his kingdom. The king must pursue a good renown and “raise up a name”. The prototype of “*al-Rabb al-Insânî*”, “*al-Insân al-Ilâhî*”, “*Malik al-sunna*” must be there.

Enki, who was the Sumerian God of Water and Wisdom, is the principle of life, resurrection, knowledge and consciousness. He is the enemy of death and ignorance. It is Enki who saves from the obscurity of the netherworld with the help of Utu, Sun God. Enki is the owner of all the means for eternal life. He is the “Guide of all travellers”. The “Seven Sages” are his sons. He knows what were in the hearts of other Gods. He is the “Universal Intellect”, for he is both the guardian of the “Table of Heaven” in which all the “*Me*”s were inscribed and of the “Boat of Heaven” on which he carries the “Table of Heaven”. With his Wisdom, he fights with the monsters named “*Kur*” (Netherworld, World of no Return) and deluge. Nanna, Moon God, is the keeper of the seals. It is Nanna who nominates someone as “King” with the commend of Anu, the Heaven God. Therefore, the kingdom descent from the heaven. Man was fashioned of clay to serve to the Gods. And the “(Goddess) Ninmah will bind upon it (the clay) the image (?) of the Gods. It is man. ...”⁷ Goddess Aruru has blown upon the figure of man, made of clay, from her breath eternal, and has given it the life. The Gods have prepared the heart of man as a place to inhabit. Gods are immortal. If the man remained to be just by imitating the Gods, he would be immortal, otherwise, he would be destroyed by a deluge. The man is a man only in society; otherwise, the man is nothing else but a “wild beast” (*Sab*⁶). For example, Enkidu, the comrade of the Sumerian King and Hero Gilgamesh, was a savage living in the forest with animals before he was educated and brought into social life by the “Girls of Inanna”. In fact, it is very hard to be a human being!

The heros have to kill all sorts of monsters by the virtues like wisdom, justice, courage, temperance and generosity to achieve a good fame

⁷ S.N. Kramer, *From the Tablets of Sumer*, (Colorado, Indian Hill, The Falcon Wing 1956), p. 143.

and to "raise up a name". To be a servant to the Gods means to live being obedient to the divine, natural and social laws. Just like Inanna the Goddess leaving her "Seven Jewels", Enkidu the Man has also left his "Seven belongings" which are his wife, his children, his suits, his perfumes, his shoes, his swords, etc. in order to descent to the netherworld. Fundamentally, this obedience is nothing else but the service of the man to another man and to the other creatures. This is the cult of Gods since the Gods are principles of the goodness. There is a strict parallelism between "*creatio Dei*" and "*imitatio Dei*". To imitate the Gods is to conform to the divine wisdom and justice, that is to say, to respect to the lives of all creatures and to believe in the eternity of these who have contributed to the human culture and civilization.

It is pointed out before, there are three kinds of "*siyāha*" according to Avicenna. The first one is the travel of the Soul during the life from the sense data to the concepts. From the epistemological point of view, this is the one of the aspects of the process named "*ittiṣāl*" (arrival, jonction). For, the object to know is not God, but the universe. According to Avicenna, the terms of "*tacallī*" (self manifestation) and "*ḡayadān*" (flux) have the same meaning. Like this, the terms of "*ittiṣāl*" (jonction, arrival), "*ish-ti'āl*" (combustion) and "*ishrāk*" (illumination) have also all the same meaning. According to Avicenna, the term "*ittiḥād*" (unification) of the *sūfī* is nothing else but "*ittiṣāl*" (arrival of man to the divine selfmanifestation).

This is the place to ask the question: How does "*ittiṣāl*" occurs? It occurs by means of the "active Intellect". The "active Intellect" is the "Guide of Travellers" just like Enki, the God of Wisdom. The detailed answer of this question can be found in Avicenna's theory of psychology or Soul.

According to Avicenna the Soul of man is a substance separated from matter. — Let us remember that Aruru has blown on the man from "exterior" (*Turaten* of Aristotle, *De Gen. n.*, II, 3, 736b, 27-28) in order to give him life. — The Soul of man can be aware of itself without any contact with the world of senses ("*Flying man*" of Avicenna, and like "*Cogito*" of Descartes). In this subject, there is literature concerning the influence of Avicenna on *Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid* of Ibn Bājjah, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* of Ibn Tofail and *Robinson Crusoe* of Daniel de Foë. The Soul is the perfection of the corpse. Without the Soul, the corpse is nothing else but a cadaver.

The corpse is the habitat of the Soul. — Remember that the heart of man is the place of Gods for Sumerians. — It is not possible for a corpse to have more than one soul. Therefore, Avicenna refuses transmigration. — Also, for Sumerians, it is not possible to return from the netherworld, since the netherworld is a place where one could not return from.—

The man does his functions of nutrition and reproduction by means of vegetable Soul which is common for all living creatures, and he does his functions of sensation and perception by means of the animal Soul which is common between the animals and the human beings, he does his function of reasoning by means of cognitive Soul which belongs only to man.

Man must know to regulate his “corporal relations” (^ع*alâ'ik al-badan*). — Let us remember the examples of temperance, in the Sumerian literature, like Gilgameshe's killing the “Bull of Heaven”, and like his refusal to the temptation of Inanna and Sabitou Sidouri, like Inanna's leaving her “Seven Jewels”, and Enkidu's leaving his “Seven Belongings”.—

The Soul of man has perceptions which come from the five external sense organs and from the *sensus communis*. The perceptions which come from exterior are always “true”, that is to say, there is always their correlates in reality. The perceptions which come from the interior are the productions of the faculties of imagination and memory. These faculties operate on the sense data. The faculty of imagination is “false” and misleading. According to Avicenna, that is to say for him there is not any correlates for the productions of the faculty of imagination in reality. The productions of the faculty of imagination are, then, chimerical. When the faculty of imagination is illuminated by the “active Intellect”, with the aid of God, all of its products become intellegible. It is only by means of this illumination that the Prophet reaches to the “Holy Faculty” “*Malaka Kudsiyya*” and the Prophet's mind becomes the “Holy Reason” (“^ع*al-Akl al-Kuddûsi*” or “^ع*al-Akl al-Kudî*”). This process of the extremely short transformations from the productions of the faculties of sensation and imagination to the concepts and from the concepts to the other concepts, which were caused by the “active Intellect”, are also, named as “*Hads*”, intuition, by Avicenna. — Let us remember that Ziusudra, when standing near a wall has suddenly heard the Gods, when they were talking to each other that they would destroy the human beings by a deluge. — The highest degree of the intuition is named intelligence. The intuition may occur by a pro-

cess of instruction or education. But its essence is to manifeste itself by neither instruction nor education. Since, the intuition is opposite to “imitation” (*taklīd*) and teaching (*“iā⁵līm”*).

According to Avicenna, there are two parts of the cognitive Soul. One is theoretical, the other is practical. By means of the theoretical Soul or Intellect, man forms concepts, unifies or separates these concepts to compose statements either affirmative or negative by reasoning and to conclude by the “middle term”. The discursive operation is nothing else but logical ones. This is what we call the thought. — Remember that Enki had made many reasoning while he was advising. — There are four levels or states in the theoretical part of the human soul. The first one is the “material (*hylic*, potential, possible) Intellect” (*“Intellectus Materialis”*). The others are: The “habitual Intellect or Reason” (*“Intellectus in habitu”*), the “actual Intellect or Reason” (*Intellectus in actu*), and the “acquired Intellect or Reason” (*“Intellectus Adeptus or Intellectus Acquisitus”*). The “material Intellect” has not any form and determination yet, but it is ready to accept them. When the “material Intellect” has some determination, it becomes the “actual Intellect” or “Intellect-in-act”. The Holy Reason is also a “material Intellect”; but, the “material Intellect” could not receive any determination by itself. It could not become “actual Intellect” by itself. It is only with the aid of the “active Intellect” (*“Dator Formarum”*, *“Vāhib al-Šuwār*) or “Giver of Forms” that the “material Intellect” receives the forms which are emanated from “active Intellect”. — Let us remember that Aruru has blown on the human figure of clay with her own holy breath. And, also, remember that Enki has known what were in the hearts of the Gods and has given what were inscribed on the “Table of Heaven” to the ones who has needed. — Therefore, the “active Intellect” works on the productions of the faculties of sensation and imagination, and binds the ideas, the intelligible or universal forms upon them. The aim of the man, when accepting what were emanated from the “Traveller’s Guide”, “active Intellect”, is to save himself from the obscurities of Isthmus Meschel (the Mountain of Meshu?), from the unknown. Thus, the “active Intellect” is the light illuminating the man’s Soul, just like the Sun, illuminating the universe. The God has lightened the intellect in the Soul. The intellect is a “gift of God”. The God has lightened the intellect in the Soul like a lampe (Aristotle). The intellect is a gift from the heaven to man. The man is “heavenly plant” (Plato). The Soul has entered to this world through a gate at the Orient. — Let us also remember Gilgamesh when

travelling to the netherworld has pierced the obscurity of the Mountain Meshu by the light of Utu, Sun God. — For Avicenna, it is only by the “active Intellect” that man could drink the sweet and clear water of logic. Because, it is only by logic that one could save himself from the obscurity of the unknown and reach to the light of the known and it is only by the light of “active Intellect” that one makes all logical operations depending on principles, in order to arrive wisdom. “The exercise of wisdom is the essence of happiness” (Aristotle).

According to Avicenna, in the “cognitive Soul”, there are three types of knowledge or concept. The first one is as follows: The concepts are presented to the Soul and the Soul has intention to these concepts in order to unify or separate them. The second is: The concepts are in the Soul, but, the Soul has no intention to these concepts. The third is: The concepts are presented in the Soul as if a question which the answer is previously known is asked. Avicenna named this third type of knowledge as “*ilm basîf*”, simple knowledge. This is the base of all the other types of knowledge. By means of it, we may directly reach to the certitude. The Soul which has this knowledge, becomes a “well polished mirror”. Because, the Soul has finally reached to the “active Intellect”. This is the arrival to all sorts of intellectual beauties. And the eternal pleasure (“*lazza sarmadiyya*”). This is the ultimate goal for man in his spiritual travel during his life. This is the ultimate happiness as Aristotle said: “The happiness is the life of the human Soul.”

If the man knows to temper his “corporal relations”, the appetits of the vegetable and animal Soul, then, he will not have any difficulties in reaching to the universal concepts by separating these concepts from their particular matter. The Intellect knows the nothingness by means of negations. In fact, neither the nonexistence nor the badness is present. What is present is the being and the goodness. This is the main point that causes us not to accept Avicenna as a Hindu-Persian originated gnostic-mystic. Avicenna is neither a nihilist, nor a dualist. He follows Alfarabius who has accepted the identity between the essence (“quiddity”) and the existence only for the Necessary Being and the difference or distinction between them for all the Contingent Beings. This is the contribution of Alfarabius, considered by Etienne Gilson as a “metaphysical *moment* in the history of philosophy.”

According to Avicenna, the cognitive Soul becomes actual in three situations: In the process of transformation from the productions of faculties of sensation and imagination to the productions of the faculty of intellection. When the cognitive Soul knows itself. When it knows the "active Intellect". In other words, the intentionality of the human intellect is either to the external world, or to itself, or to the "active Intellect". If, its intentionality is to the external world, the production of the Soul will be theoretical philosophy, that is to say, the mathematics, the physics, and the theology in the sense of metaphysics. If its intentionality is to itself, the production will be to review its own theoretical and practical philosophy in order to be more conscious. If its intentionality is to the "active Intellect", its production will be to reach to the perfect certitude, by means of the "simple knowledge", which is named as "*lazẓa sarmadiyya*", eternal pleasure, by Avicenna. This pleasure can be felt as "*ânât*" (moments). These "*ânât*" consisted of many little sparks of truth. If these "*ânât*" is named as *gnosis*, let it be; the words are out discussion. The discussion will be on the contents of *gnosis*, that is to say, the discussion will be on what is seen during the "ecstasy". It is obvious that, the "views" which are obtained during the "ecstasy" will be very different from each other for each person, and will perhaps be contrary and contradictory. In fact the "exile" is alone everywhere, that is, it is not possible for him to make his *expérience vécue* pass to another person. There will naturally be many contrarities between the "views", as can be seen in the history of mankind.

The second travel made by the human Soul during the life is to reach the knowledge about God by the "Guidence of the active Intellect". The Soul which travels under this guidance must first of all, temper its "corporal relations", like the wishes, the anger, the fears, the hates, the detestations, the vexations, etc. and then endure voluntarily the "life of exile". The "exile" begins with a deliberate decision, then comes to the habitude of transforming from the productions of the faculty of sensation and imagination to the productions of the faculty of intellection. This means the devotion to philosophy, science and art. As the "middle term" prepares the human Soul to the ability of discourse and to conclude, the philosophy, the science and the art prepares the human Soul to reach to the knowledge about God.

The one who has reached the knowledge about God, is neither "*â-bid*" (one who worships God by the external means of the ritual and pray-

er; who practises Islâm by fulfilling the religious duties with sincere piety and devotion), nor “*zâhid*” (Sûfi ascetic) and nor “*ârif*” (one who knows God; the speculative mystic; man of discernment), but “*ârif mutanazzih*” who desires the knowledge about God for nothing else but God himself. This is the third travel of the Soul before taking off its suit of corpse. This is to travel to the norms of “*ârif mutanazzih*” by the guidance of the “active Intellect”. This is to travel to the practical philosophy, opening the doors to the eternal life for all the humanity.