INTRODUCTION

In order to explain and elucidate the Turkish contribution to the universal history of thought one ought to carry out an intensive study extending to many volumes. Here we intend to select only some of the views of a few major Turkish thinkers who contributed much to the development of human thought in general and the philosophical culture in particular.

Now, as we all know, the Muslim contribution to different branches of philosophical knowledge formed a turning point in the history of ideas. Strictly speaking, Islamic Philosophy started with Ya‘qub ibn Ishâq al-Kindî (d. circa. 873) who was the only Arab philosopher. Al-Kindî represents the first important attempt to harmonize philosophy with religion. He wrote many works on different aspects of philosophy and thus tried to strengthen the scientific and philosophical spirit in Islamic culture.

Al-Kindî, “The Philosopher of the Arabs”, however, did not leave a systematic body of thought behind him. Philosophy became a serious discipline in the hands of two great philosophers, Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ, both of whom are of Turkish descent. Of the former, the well-known Muslim historian Ibn Khallikân makes the following comment:¹

Al-Fârâbî was a celebrated philosopher, the greatest indeed that the Muslims ever had; he composed a number of works on logic, music, and other sciences. No Muslim ever reached in the philosophical sciences the same rank as he; and it was through the imitation of his style that Ibn Sinâ attained proficiency and rendered his own work so useful.

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Of the greatness of Al-Fârâbî, the Turk, let us hear the words of another witness. In a letter to Samuel ben Tibbon, Maimonides (Ibn Maymûn), the greatest Jewish philosopher in the Middle Ages, says this: “I recommend you to read no works on logic other than those of the philosopher Abû Naṣr al-Fârâbî; since all he wrote, especially the ‘Book of Principles’ is fine flour.” Later on we will have something to say about the influences of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ upon the medieval Jewish and Christian philosophers.

Al-Fârâbî, whose full name is Muhammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzlugh Abû Naṣr al-Fârâbî (Alfarabius or Avennasar of the medieval Latin world) was born in a village near Farab in 870. Having learnt Arabic, he studied mathematics, logic and other disciplines under many famous teachers of his time. He was the first Turkish philosopher to make name. Being a great interpreter of Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics, and a very deep thinker himself, he was called “The Second Master,” i.e., the Second Aristotle. In his personal life and as a scholar, he was a philosopher par excellence. Even if he had been a mere compiler of ancient wisdom and been satisfied with such an activity, he would still deserve the gratitude of mankind. But he was an extremely original thinker and had a philosophical system of his own — a system which was vigorously followed by Ibn Sînâ and severely criticized by Al-Ghazâlî.

Al-Fârâbî excelled in practically all branches of philosophy, mainly in logic, metaphysics, rational psychology, ethics and politics. He thought that philosophy travelled many lands and, unfortunately, came to an end in places where it flourished. Therefore, it needed a new home and a new life; which, according to Al-Fârâbî, could be found nowhere but in the heartlands of Islam.

We have already made some allusions to the name of Ibn Sînâ who followed Al-Fârâbî very closely. Abû ‘Alî al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Abdullâh ibn Sînâ (980-1037), generally known as Avicenna in the medieval Latin world, was also of Turkish origin. He modelled his philosophical system more or less on that of Al-Fârâbî and exerted a deep influence upon the subsequent development of philosophical ideas. Now, let us have a look at the contributions of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ first to the field of logic and then to other branches of philosophy.
LOGIC:

Both Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ are logicians in the fullest sense of the term. They wrote many independent works in the field, and also wrote important commentaries on the entire logical corpus of Aristotle. The last remark is especially true in the case of Al-Fârâbî.

Al-Fârâbî’s *Introduction to Logic* and *Abridgment of Logic* are fairly well known. In his commentaries, which are usually written in the triplicate manner, i.e., short, middle, and long, Al-Fârâbî did not only try to explain Aristotle’s logic, but advanced many original views of his own. In some parts of his logical works, for instance, he discusses some metaphysical and theological matters such as the metaphysical implications of the term “necessity,” God’s knowledge of future contingencies and determinism, the logical status of divine predicates, and the like. Now, all these matters were completely foreign to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle from whom Muslim philosophers benefited much. So, unless one makes a careful study of the metaphysical outputs of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ in the light of their logic, one is bound to obtain an insufficient — even incorrect — knowledge of their total philosophy. This is a fact which seems to have escaped the attentions of many ancient and modern students of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ. For example, had Al-Ghazâlî, the writer of the famous *The Inconsistency of the Philosophers*, paid enough attention to the logical works of the *falâsifâ* in which, as we have just mentioned, many theological problems are discussed, he would have been more reluctant in his historically famous — or infamous to some — accusation in which it was claimed that the philosophers had gone astray and thus undermined the Qur’anic teachings concerning some important matters of faith.

Although Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ took over many views from the Neo-Platonic tradition, their minds mainly remained Aristotelian. The empirical character of Aristotle’s philosophy runs through the works of both philosophers. A glance at their theory of intellect, and their view concerning the nature of experience may be sufficient to prove the correctness of our remark. According to them, the use of deductive and inductive methods is indispensable for the attainment of correct knowledge.
Al-Fārābī, like Ibn Sīnā after him, considered logic not only a tool, but an independent scientific discipline. It is unanimously accepted by the historians of logic that Al-Fārābī’s logic is acute, original, and attests as a whole a profound knowledge of the subject. As the well-known modern American philosopher N. Rescher states, “Al-Fārābī was one of the few original thinkers in logic produced in Islam. Many of his significant logical contributions are only beginning to come to light.”

Logic, according to Al-Fārābī, leads us to the knowledge of the unknown from the known, which is the way to distinguish the truth from the false in any search of knowledge. It is divided into five major subjects: Concepts, definitions, judgments, inferences, and proofs. It is the doctrine of proof which is, according to our philosopher, logic properly so called, since only this part of logic can generate science in the broadest sense of the term. Al-Fārābī pays a great deal of attention to the problem of “particulars” and “universals.” Particulars, says Al-Fārābī, is found in things, in sense perception and in thought. Universals are abstracted from things. It seems that Al-Fārābī anticipated the famous distinction of the anterem, in re, and postrem.

Al-Fārābī also touches some logical problems which occupied a central place in philosophy, especially after Kant. One of them may be mentioned as an example: Is “existence” a predicate? This question gained an immense importance when Kant tried to refute the classical Ontological Argument for the existence of God. The discussion of this problem by Al-Fārābī precedes the Critique of Pure Reason by well-nigh a millennium, and antedates St. Anselm, the systematizer of the Argument, by fully a century. According to Al-Fārābī “existence” can be a predicate, if we look at it from the point of view of logic and grammar; but this is not to say that it is an informative predicate. In other words, existence is not a category of actuality which asserts something new about things. Thus, from the point of view of the natural scientist, says Al-Fārābī, the existence of a thing is nothing other than the thing itself.

As a result of Al-Fārābī’s effort, the study of logic became disseminated throughout the major centres of learning of the Islamic

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lands. His commentaries and the works written by him represent the highest marks of mastery of the technical machinery of logic, which paved the way for Ibn Sinâ's further, and still greater, achievements. In his numerous and orderly works, Ibn Sinâ followed the lead of Al-Fârâbî in most major issues. Although he is sometimes very critical of what is usually called the "Baghdad School" of logic, to which Al-Fârâbî was also attached, he had a high opinion of the Second Teacher. Evaluating the merits of the logical works of the ancients, Ibn Sinâ says that "Abû Naṣr al-Fârâbî is a philosopher of whom one must think most highly and not put him on the same level as the others. He is the best among the philosophers of the former times."

Ibn Sinâ, the intellectual pole of medieval Islam as well as the Latin world, had an independent mind; he never hesitated to criticize the views of his predecessors and made his own original contributions. It is usually claimed that his independent attitude towards especially Aristotle represents an approach not found in the whole world until the Renaissance. Ibn Sinâ seems to be fully aware of his fresh start. For example, he says that the uncritical follower of Aristotle spends his life in occupation with the past, without taking time to resort to his own intelligence; and even if he took the time, he would believe that it is not permitted to regard the statements of the ancients as in need of any addition, correction, and improvement.

In logic, Ibn Sinâ was a great systematizer; in his hands this discipline reached the peak of its development. A powerful mind as he was, Ibn Sinâ corrected the mistakes of his predecessors and put forward many original points such as his theory of categorical propositions involving quantification of the predicate, his view of the hypothetical and disjunctive propositions, the analysis of the concept of existence, and the like. In fact, he offered a daring innovation concerning the treatment of the whole discipline. He opposed the idea that logic is but the study of the Aristotelian texts. For him, and for the tradition dominated by his influence, logic ought to be considered not just a commentary upon Aristotle, but a self-sufficient field of inquiry. According to the eminent French thinker Carra de Vaux, "Ibn Sinâ's logic is open, clear, and at many places recalling the analysis of Leibniz."3

METAPHYSICS:

Metaphysics, which concerns itself with the problem of being qua being, is the core of Al-Fârîbî’s theoretical philosophy. It was in this part of philosophy that Al-Fârîbî and his foremost disciple Ibn Sinâ made their contributions. Here Al-Fârîbî starts with the teachings of Plato and Aristotle as they were interpreted in the School of Baghdad in his time. Although he preferred the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle, he was of the opinion that the basic views of Aristotle and Plato were essentially the same. He wrote an independent work entitled On the Agreement Between the Views of Plato and Those of Aristotle to prove this point. He, then, took a second step and tried to show that there is no conflict between philosophy and religion; in other words, between reason and revelation.

Al-Fârîbî’s metaphysics starts with the analysis of the concept of “being” which is accepted as the simplest concept of all and precedes them all. It is also the most universal concept which resists any attempt to resolve it into simpler elements of thought. This is the reason of its undefinability.

Al-Fârîbî’s key philosophical terms are fairly well-known. To begin with, he makes the following distinctions which influenced deeply the subsequent course of philosophy:

a) Contingent Being and Necessary Being:

“We see things that are.” This is the first step in the analysis of the concept of being in the whole Islamic philosophy and theology. The Muslim thinkers are realist in this respect. The reality of the external world is asserted throughout, and thus no solipsism is ever involved. Now, things that exist in the world are all contingent, i. e., they might not have existed. In order to be they need another being which is itself not contingent. The last being is called the Necessary Being— a Being that exists in Himself, and the non-existence of Him is impossible. We will come back to this line of thought again when we evaluate Al-Fârîbî’s idea of Godhood.

b) Potentiality and Actuality:

The term potentiality indicates the capacity of being, whereas actuality indicates that which exists in fact. Both potentiality and actuality constitute the core of reality. Physical reality is becoming, or rather being in the process of becoming.
c) *Substance and Accident:*

Substance is that which exists in itself and serves as a subject or basis for the accidents and accidental changes. Accident is that which has not autonomous existence; it needs a substance in which it exists.

d) *Essence and Existence:*

Essence is that whereby a thing is what it is. Existence is that whereby the essence is an actuality.

e) *Matter and Form:*

Things are composed of matter and form. Matter is a capacity and becomes actuality as soon as it takes a form. There is an inter-dependency between form and matter.

Ibn Sīnā followed Al-Fārābī very closely in his metaphysical system which he worked out in his own special way. He too believes in the unity of philosophical sciences and adopts more or less the same distinctions. The idea of being, says Ibn Sīnā in his *Book of Healing* (Kitāb al-Shifā) and *Kitāb al-Nejāt* (Book of Salvation), imprints itself on the soul before anything else. For example, the soul can grasp its existence even before grasping its spiritual nature, and can do this without the help of any sensual experience.

Al-Fārābī’s distinction between essence and existence received full support from Ibn Sīnā and became the central point of his metaphysics. According to Ibn Sīnā, from the concrete beings in the world human mind derives universal concepts applicable to all the individuals of a group. For example, the concept of man expresses man’s nature, but man himself is possible, thus his essence does not exist by itself. Existence is given to him from outside. This is true for all the individual beings. Essence is distinct from existence in all beings which have a beginning in time. This is not a logical distinction only but an ontological one as well.

Now, the distinction between essence and existence has a considerable bearing upon the philosophical theism of Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Although both owe much to the Greek and Neo-Platonic sources, their theistic world view remains, in its basic lines, within the framework of the Qur’anic *weltanschauung*. Here they forced the Aristotelian metaphysics to take a step further and to be a means for the explanation of basis Islamic concepts totally unknown to any
Greek philosopher. The concepts that we touched upon a little while ago cannot be understood, unless we take cognizance of the concept of a Necessary Being which they identify with the Qur’anic conception of God.

One of the central problems of Al-Fârâbî’s philosophy is the knowability of God. It has always been difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this perennial question. According to Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ, God has the highest perfection, and if so, then it seems quite plausible to think that our knowledge of Him should be perfect too. “This is not the case,” says Al-Fârâbî. This lack of knowledge has nothing to do with the certainty of the proposition “God is”; it is rather due to the weakness of our intellectual capacity, which is the result of the union of our intellect with matter. On the other hand, God’s ultimate perfection dazzles our vision and makes us unable to have a complete conception of Him. It is a well-established fact that the more perfect the light is, the more it bewilders our power of sight. This does not mean, however, that we can have no conception of Him. When we attain the intellectual and moral perfections through the elimination of material (bodily) impediments, and our intellect becomes intellect-in-act, thus fully actual, our conception of God grows comparatively clear, and when our intellect becomes totally free of matter, it will attain the most complete conception available for man. To attain this stage of intellectual perfection leads man to his ultimate felicity as well.

Despite the weakness of our intellectual power, what kind of things can we say when we “talk of God”? Al-Fârâbî answers this question in his two major works: The Virtuous City and The Political Regime. We are told that God is the First Being, the First Cause, the most Perfect Being whose non-existence is unthinkable, the Pure Actuality, the First Principle, the First Truth, the Pure Good and the like. Al-Fârâbî does not seem to be very keen on advancing what is usually called the “formal” proofs for the existence of Deity. In fact, in his two famous works mentioned above we see no fully developed rational arguments. For Al-Fârâbî God’s existence is not so

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5 Al-Madîna al-Fâdîla, p. 34.
much inferred as seen clearly and distinctly necessary. However, in some of his minor works — in the *Sources of Questions,* for instance — we have some brief versions of the following arguments:

1. The Proof from Motion: The roots of this argument, as we all know, go back to Aristotle. We observe that there are things which move. Now, every object that moves receives its movement from another being, and so on. This cannot go *ad infinitum,* and thus a Prime Mover is required, a Prime Mover which Himself is not moved by any other being.

2. The Proof from Efficient Cause: Everything that we see in the world is composite in nature. Anything that is composed of other things requires an efficient cause for the composition that it has. The series of efficient causes cannot go indefinitely. There must, then, be an uncaused efficient cause, and this is God.

3. The Proof from Contingency: We have already touched on the analysis of the concept of contingency. Since this concept is central to the philosophies of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ, it may not be out of place to analyse it further and show its bearing upon the argument for the existence of God.

Now, when we examine the things around us, we see that they are not in a position to account for their existence. They are all possible; they may or may not exist. There is no logical difficulty in thinking of their non-existence, since there is nothing in their concept which is contrary to their non-realisability.

What are the indications of contingency? *Change.* Without the idea of change we cannot understand, let alone explain, the world of “generation and corruption.” Each temporal thing has its own time. Its explanation requires another Being which “specifies,” as Ibn Sînâ would say, it with existence. Without such an act of specification, the chain of causes and effects in the realm of contingent beings would go endlessly, which is contrary to reason.

Such an analysis leads Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ to the concept of Necessary Being. Here, necessity means that Being in question has no cause, and the actual existence is a *sine qua non* for Him. Contingent beings must end in a Necessary Being; in such a Being essence

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and existence are identical. The unconditioned and uncaused character of God is precisely the condition of His Necessary Existence.

Al-Fârâbî’s argument for the existence of God, though, as we have said, was not his favorite theme, it had a great influence on the subsequent Muslim and medieval European philosophy. Arguments from movement, efficient causation and contingency were directly taken over by St. Thomas Aquinas and through him different types of cosmological arguments became the indispensable piece of philosophical reasoning, especially in the field of rational theology. We will have something to say later on about the influence of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ on Western philosophy.

Before we finish our discussion about the theistic arguments of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ, a few words about the historical roots of the well-known Ontological Argument which was clearly formulated by St. Anselm (1033-1109). It is noteworthy to see that Al-Fârâbî uses practically all the terms that are used by St. Anselm. According to Al-Fârâbî, God is the most perfect Being Whose non-existence is unthinkable. Nothing can be greater than, and similar to, Him. Now these are the very expressions used in the Ontological Argument. They indicate man’s immediate awareness of an Infinite Being and his dependence upon Him. But Al-Fârâbî does not, as far as we can see, argue from the idea of perfection to the reality of God, which is the core of the formal ontological argument. The basic difference between Al-Fârâbî and St. Anselm is, to my mind, that the latter takes our immediate feeling — or knowledge, if you prefer — of God’s existence as something constituting in itself a deductive proof, whereas the former does not think so. The history of the Argument and the voluminous discussions on it prove the correctness of Al-Fârâbî’s position.

Ibn Sinâ took Al-Fârâbî’s idea of the necessary existence of God and gave it a somewhat loose formal structure in a theological work written in Persian. But, again, Ibn Sinâ too accepts the reality of a Necessary Being as the object of our direct intuition. In other words, he does not affirm the existence of the Necessary Being merely as the terminus of the cosmological argument.

Since both Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ take God’s existence for granted, they pay more attention to the “names” and “attributes” of God. In their works we see that Qur’anic terminology and metaphysical terminology are used side by side. In Ibn Sinâ the em-
ployment of the Qur'anic terms is more frequent. Basing themselves on the well-known Qur'anic "light verse," both philosophers say that "God is the First, and the Last, the Obvious and the Hidden". He is Pure Actuality, and He is the Truth. He is unique in every respect and, thus, One. He knows Himself and the whole universe. He possesses the highest degree of Wisdom, Life, and Will. He is Generous and Just. He is the Creator of everything. He Himself is the Most Beautiful, and the principle of beauty in every thing. God is the object of sublime love and devotion, and worthy of worship. He is worshipped not only because of His Power and Majesty, but because of His being the Source of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty.

The religious philosophy of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ is based upon the Qur'anic idea of the Oneness of God (ta'whîd). In this respect their influence is far-reaching. It is worth noting that the Christian theologians who came under the influence of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ could not speak of trinity, or the divine nature of Christ in their philosophical works. The contributions of these two great Muslim philosophers to philosophical monotheism are beyond any doubt.

PSYCHOLOGY:

The psychological views of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ are closely tied up with their ethical and political philosophies. The analysis of the nature of the soul and its relation to the body are essential for a correct understanding of human nature as a whole. Again, the main parts, or faculties of the soul are used as a basis for the classification of human excellences as ethical and intellectual. Being Muslims, Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ reject the view that the soul's entry into the body is not natural and thus the source of all evil. There is nothing wrong with the body as long as man is not dominated by bodily pleasures.

Al-Fârâbî divides the main parts of the soul into five: 7 The nutritive, the sensory, and the estimative, the appetitive, and the rational. There is a master-servant relationship between these different faculties of the soul. The one below serves the one above. As a matter of fact, Al-Fârâbî sees the same hierarchical order in a perfect socio-political orginization, and in the universe. 8 The rational part is

7 Fuṣûl al-Madâni, section, 6.
divided into theoretical and practical; the former connected with the intellectual, and the latter with the moral virtues.

The first initial capacity which everybody shares is the potential intellect. In itself this part of the soul, or what Al-Fârâbî in one or two places calls "simple substance," is not immortal; it becomes so when it becomes the intellect-in-act, which means to attain to the state of actuality. This is possible when man receives the first intelligibles which are the primary principles of knowledge. There are three first intelligibles: Primary principles of knowledge, of geometry, the principles of the knowledge of good and evil (moral knowledge), and the principles of metaphysical knowledge.

According to Al-Fârâbî, people do not have the same natural aptitude for knowledge. There are some who can cognize the realities of things, and there are some who can only imagine them. Now, these two terms are extremely important in Al-Fârâbî’s philosophy. A thing can be called cognitive so far as it is controlled and used by the intellect. In this case the intellect must have an absolute authority over other faculties, i. e., sensitive, representative, and so forth, each of which has its own perfection. A thing is called imaginative, if the reality of that thing is represented as a symbol or imitation. What is cognised is universal, and what is imagined can vary; there can be many different imitations of the same reality. Those who have the power of cognitions are called "the wise men," and those who can only imagine are called the simple "believers." Philosophers and the prophets constitute the first group; but there is a difference between a philosopher and a prophet. The prophet, say, the Prophet Muhammad, has the power of cognition and the power of imagination. So, through revelation he could translate what is cognizable to what is imaginable. Looking from this specific point of view, the prophet’s position is much higher than the position of a philosopher who does not have the support of divine revelation. Thus, the common conviction that Al-Fârâbî gives a higher status to the philosopher seems to have no foundation. Of course, cognition is much higher than imagination; but as we have just said, the prophet has both powers anyway.

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9 Alfarabis Philosophische Abhandlungen, p. 64.
10 Al-Madina al-Fâdila, p. 84; cf., As-Siyâsa al-Madaniyya, p. 74.
11 As-Siyâsa al-Madaniyya, pp. 85 f.
As for Ibn Sīnā, in his psychology he tries to reach a harmony between the views of Al-Fārābī and those of Abū Bakr ar-Râzî (d. 932). But the empirical character of Ibn Sīnā’s psychology which we see especially in his medical works, is more apparent. In addition to this, one can also see the development of a religious psychology, or psychology of mysticism in Ibn Sīnā’s works. This psychology, which is mainly explained in the last section of a book called Al-Ishârât wa’l-tanbîhât and some small mystical treatises, can be considered the centre of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical system.

In the classification of the faculties of the soul and in the definition of their functions, Ibn Sīnā follows Al-Fārābī. He puts more emphasis on the prophetic consciousness which is linked to the function of the highest degree of the intellect, i. e., the “sacred intellect,” given by God to specially selected people, that is to say, the prophets. Ibn Sīnā also makes it very clear that the rational part of the soul is conscious of its own existence, not externally, i. e., through the activities of the senses, but internally, i. e., by the immediate and direct exercise of its own reasoning power, which proves that the soul is a substance and has an independent existence. Al-Fārābī accepts the immortality of the soul which has gone through the process of self-actualization; but he does not seem to believe the immortality of the potential intellect which he considers a kind of disposition. According to Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, the soul’s immortality is something that belongs to its very nature, and does not depend on the degree of its self-actualization or self-perfection. But both philosophers agree that the happiness of the soul depends entirely upon its degree of self-actualization. If and when man works hard and gains theoretical and moral perfections, he becomes happy here and in the hereafter. If he is morally wicked, though he knows what is good and bad, he will be miserable in this world and in the world-to-come.

For the attainment of the eternal happiness man needs the help of revelation, according to Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. They both believe that religion provides us with the same truth as philosophy, albeit in a symbolic manner which is required for the benefit of mankind at large. Both believed that there are some divinely gifted persons,

i. e., prophets who can receive revelation from God, and guide men in accordance with its teachings, without which a civil community cannot be maintained. They have an unshakable faith in the truth of Islam and the superiority of Islamic culture; and they are extremely broad-minded toward other religious faiths, which they accept as somewhat less accurate representations of the same truth. In some matters of interpretation they deviated from the commonly accepted currents, but this is no reason to raise any suspicion concerning their religious commitments, loyalties, and so on.

**ETHICAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:**

As it has been pointed out earlier, in the philosophical system of Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā, what is usually called Practical Philosophy, i. e., ethics, politics, and to some extent economics, cannot be separated from theoretical philosophy. For example, the study of the soul is necessary for a correct estimation of the practical requirements of man. As moral philosophers, both Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā are teleologist, i. e., they first determine what the ultimate good of man is and then evaluate his actions accordingly. They are also eudaimonist in their own way. They believe that happiness (as-saṭāda) is good without qualification. Whatever leads man to happiness is good, and whatever obstructs the way to it is evil. According to them, man is potentially perfect: as a natural creature there is nothing wrong with him. Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā both oppose to the idea of the original sin.

Good is divided into two:¹³ Good as a means, good as an end. Only the last one is desired for its own sake. So as to reach the ultimate good, man ought to work very hard to determine the right means. Unfortunately, most men fail in the determination of the right ends and means. This is the reason for the ruthless struggle that is going on in the whole human history.

Though man is always in need of divine help, he has the power to determine the right end, and the free-will to act accordingly. Without the freedom of acting against the natural inclinations, we could not talk of the moral character of man, which is gained by natural dis-

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¹³ *Al-Madinat al-Fādila*, p. 86.
position and by the willed actions.\textsuperscript{14} Both Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā reject hard determinism and all kinds of fatalism. Since man has power and freedom to choose, he carries a great weight of responsibility on his shoulders. It is within his power, says Al-Fārābī, to be a divine man, or what the ancients usually called the wild beast, the most wretched creature on the earth.

In order to have a solid moral character, man ought to stick to the Golden Mean, which consists in the performance of the virtuous actions, which are in their turn defined as the actions free of any excesses and defects. A good action becomes virtuous action when man finds its performance easy and even pleasurable.\textsuperscript{15}

Now, man is a social animal, and in order to achieve his perfection and happiness, he needs a social and political environment. Without the help of political science, or what Al-Fārābī calls “the highest art in the Virtuous City,”\textsuperscript{16} man will not be able to actualize his potentialities. As far as political philosophy is concerned, the Muslim Turkish thinkers, especially Al-Fārābī were very different from the Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophers. It was Al-Fārābī, for instance, who gave Plato’s Republic the place that it deserves. Unlike Proclus, who disliked Plato’s Laws and the Republic, Al-Fārābī was glad that the divine Plato had written them.\textsuperscript{17} He did not believe, as the Stoics did, that the happiness of a wise man depends entirely on himself alone. Nor did he stress, as Porphyry and many others did, the otherworldly aspect of the life of a philosopher — a stress which led them to ignore the political writings of Plato and Aristotle. There is no doubt that this deep interest in political philosophy has something to do with Al-Fārābī’s Islamic background, especially with his idealization of the activities of the Prophet Muhammad as a statesman. According to him, understanding religion as a social phenomenon means understanding it in terms of political science. He seems to see a great deal of similarities between Islam and what is usually called the classical political philosophy

\textsuperscript{14} As-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{15} At-Tanbîh ‘alâ Sabîl as-Sa’ûda, Hyderabad 1346/1927, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{16} Al-Madîna al-Fâdila, p. 102; cf. Kitâb Tahsîl as-Sa’ûda, Hyderabad 1345/1926, p. 16.
Al-Fârâbî’s idea of political philosophy, and especially his classification of the states, i.e., cities, largely depends on his concept of happiness to which we have already referred several times. He deals with politics, psychology, ethics and metaphysics within the same single framework in his well-known two books, *The Virtuous City* and the *Political Regime*. The Virtuous City is ruled by a just and loving ruler whom Al-Fârâbî calls "the First Head." The ruler must possess many qualities, such as wisdom, courage, physical strength and so on. In fact, he has to combine theoretical and practical perfections in his personality. But it is not always possible to find a person with these traits of personality. One can say that according to Al-Fârâbî, only the Prophet Muḥammad had the highest limit of the perfections which our philosopher hopes to see in the "First Head" of the state. But it is very difficult to have a leader with such a degree of perfection; in this case more than one persons may join together to make up the leadership. In other words, the most important thing is to see the required virtues in the state machinery; so, a person, for example, who has the power of cognition can join another person who has the power of deliberation, which is indispensable for the defence of the state, and they can thus run the state together. Quite a number of Muslim philosophers did not accept this solution of Al-Fârâbî and criticized him severely. It was rejected by Abū l-Ḥasan Al-ʿĀmirī (d. 991-992) and Al-Ghazâlî, (d. 1111) and by those who had a Shiʿite leaning.

Broadly speaking, the people of the Virtuous City are divided into two major classes: 18 The wisemen of the city who are able to cognize God, incorporeal realities, the nature of human happiness and the like; and those who are only able to know these things through images. These two classes correspond to the epistemological distinction between cognition and imagination. It is the duty of the wise to instruct the common people, and provide them with appropriate images concerning the realities of things.

After a thorough examination of the opinions and actions in the Virtuous City, Al-Fârâbî comes to those cities which he calls "the Ignorant Cities." 19 He divides these cities into many groups such

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18 *Al-Madīna al-Fādila*, p. 122; *As-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya*, p. 86.
as the Vile City, the Base City, the City of Honour, the City of Victo-
ry and Domination, the Despotic City, and so on. In each city
people have different aims and ideals. For example, the first city in
the list aims at money, wealth, and other worldly pleasures; the
second aims at bodily pleasures; the third at the attainment of honour
and so on. All of them have wrong conceptions of man's nature,
society, and politics. The people of the Virtuous City, especially its
ruling class, must keep an eye on the activities of these ignorant cities,
and try to perform civilizing policies in their attitudes towards them.
This is the meaning of the "Holy War," according to Al-Fârâbî.

Ibn Sinâ, though he was actively engaged in political affairs
personally, did not write much on political theorising. By and large
he seems to agree with Al-Fârâbî on major points.

In order to appreciate the contributions of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn
Sinâ, we have to touch, though briefly, on the influences they exerted
on the later development of philosophical ideas. Their views had
their immediate influence, as it has been pointed out earlier on,
upon the Jewish philosophical thought. It seems to be quite reasonable
to say that the medieval Jewish thought, in its purely philosophical
aspect, was almost a continuation of the Farabian tradition. That
is why many great Jewish philosophers wrote their works in Arabic
and dealt with more or less the same problems as Muslim philosophers
did. They also participated fully in the transmission of Islamic
culture to the Western World. The influence of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn
Sinâ extends as far as Spinoza through the same Jewish channel.
In fact in the speculative system of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ we come
across the clear anticipation of many views of Descartes, Leibniz,
Spinoza, Kant, and Bergson.

We all know that the Medieval Western world came to know the
basic Greek works through the works of Muslim philosophers. The
translation of the Arabic versions of the Aristotelian corpus, the
commentaries, and the abridgments produced a cultural turning
point in the intellectual history of the Western world. We also know
that the serious study of Aristotle in the time of Scholasticism begins
with Albertus Magnus (1206-1280) who used Ibn Sinâ's commenta-
ries. Both Albert and his brilliant student St. Thomas Aquinas, who
shaped the future of Christianity, adopted a version of modified
Aristotelianism which was, to a large extent, Al-Fârâbî's and especially Ibn Sinâ's version of the Aristotelian philosophy.

When we have a serious look at the historical studies carried out up to now, we can easily see, despite the insufficiency of researches, the deep influence of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ not only in the fields of logic or natural philosophy, but in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and political philosophy as well. As we have pointed out, Muslim philosophers' analysis of being, their division of beings into contingent and necessary, their definitions of universals and other key metaphysical terms had a lasting impact on the Thomistic and Scotist synthesis. Al-Fârâbî's theistic views were quoted in many instances en bloc. This is especially true in the case of Thomas Aquinas, who was the head of the Latin Schoolmen. Before the Islamic influence, to talk of the "attributes" of God was almost unknown in the Christian theology. Islamic views of the attributes waited five hundred and fifty years and begat the attributes of the Schoolmen, and the attributes of the Schoolmen lived four hundred years and begat the attributes of Descartes and Spinoza. In fact, the early Church fathers knew little concerning the talk of God except in terms of trinity.

As we mentioned above, Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ anticipated some important views that now we find in the works of the major contemporary philosophers. For example, long before Descartes Ibn Sinâ showed that "being" is the first intuition of the mind. Again, Descartes' idea of the primary intuition of the ego is very close to Ibn Sinâ's idea the self-awareness of the soul exemplified in his doctrine of the "flying man." Some similarities also exist in their views of the Necessary Being, though there are some differences as well concerning this point.

So far we tried to explain, albeit very briefly, the main contributions of Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ to the universal philosophical culture. Now we have to look at the contribution of another Turkish thinker who is not, strictly speaking, a philosopher, though for many a solution of his difficulties he was indebted to the methods used by philosophers. This was Abû Rayḥân Muḥammad bin Aḥmad Al-Beyrûnî (973-1048). This great man stands as a model of the thinker who was able to harmonize within his own intellectual world various forms of knowledge, from the science of nature to religion and phi-
losophy. Al-Beyrûnî has an extremely clear international outlook, in his effort to remove the misunderstandings between various communities and bring humanity closer in their outlook upon the world. He was the major key for a real cultural contact between different races and nations. It is because of his great contributions to many fields, especially to the scientific spirit in general, that G. Sarton, the well-known historian of science, wishes to name the eleventh century “the Age of Al-Beyrûnî.”

He seems to be the first Muslim thinker who had a first-hand knowledge of Indian philosophical and religious culture, in addition to sound knowledge of Greek and Islamic philosophical and scientific literature — a knowledge which enabled him to make useful comparisons between different cultures. This effort was no doubt a happy intellectual pursuit from which many historians of culture benefit much even today. The scientific and philosophical erudition exhibited in his Al-âthâr al-Bâkiya and Kitâb mâ li'l-Hind is a dazzling achievement.

One of the important contributions of Al-Beyrûnî can be seen in his account of scientific method, or the ethics of scientific investigation. In the introductory chapter of his Al-âthâr al-Bâkiya, Al-Beyrûnî makes it very clear that in order to be an honest investigator, one has to free himself from all kinds of prejudices, selfish motivations, and every kind of harmful elements which prevent many from following the right course in the search of truth. Commenting upon Al-Beyrûnî’s work on India, G. von Grunebaum, the famous historian of Islamic culture, states that Al-Beyrûnî was able to develop and apply in his book that descriptive attitude towards another civilization which on the whole has been a distinctive trait of the West.20

It should be borne in mind, however, that this attitude of Al-Beyrûnî though very striking indeed, is not at all unique and seems to be a fairly common trait of Islamic scientific and philosophical history. We see the same attitude in Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ as well, for example. In fact, one might say that such an attitude was one of the characteristics of the Turkish philosophers and men of science,

such as Zamakhsharî in the fields of tafsîr (the interpretation of the Qur'an), Al-Bukhârî in the field of hadîth (the collection and interpretation of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), Al-Mâturidî in theology, Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ in philosophy, and of course Al-Beyrûnî especially in cultural history. It is noteworthy that most of these men were born and brought up in the Turkish areas of Central Asia which were far away from the main centers of theological and political controversies. To cite only a few examples, Al-Fârâbî, in his commentary on a work of “Zinon the Great,” criticizes and even condemns some Christian Scholars who added many things and left out many statements while commenting upon the Greek philosophical writings. Al-Beyrûnî speaks as follows: “Between an investigator of truth and a staunch follower of tradition there is, surely, a great difference.”21 The same view is shared by one of his great contemporaries, Ibn Sînâ, who, commenting upon the attitudes of those who followed Aristotle blindly, says that they spend their times in occupation with the past without resorting to their own intelligence.

Al-Beyrûnî condemns the use of scientific knowledge to mislead and harm people. He warns again and again against “the sciences which prey on the ignorance of the people.” 22 He, like Al-Fârâbî, warns us against “the crimes committed by translators.” 23 His simple principle is this: Seek after truth even if it may be against you. One “should not refuse to accept the truth from any source, wherever one can find it.” 24 Despite the incessant wars between the Muslims and the Hindus, Al-Beyrûnî managed to remain impartial while he was writing his major work on India. It is incredible to see in him a man trying sympathetically to have an access to the minds of those who were regarded, politically, as foes by the dynasty under which Al-Beyrûnî served.

In the introduction of his India Al-Beyrûnî makes the characteristic features of his approach very clear: To begin with, he says that he will investigate the truth of everything he hears, since “what we

23 The Determination, p. 7.
24 The Determination, p. 79.
hear is not like what we see.” Concerning his book he says “I shall not produce the arguments of our antagonists in order to refute such of them as I believe to be in the wrong. My book is nothing but a simple historic record of facts.” His main purpose for writing a book on India is “to help those who want to discuss religious questions with them and associate with them.”

Now, such an objective attitude developed and fully applied by Al-Bīrūnī is also indicative of the freedom of thought that existed during the reign of Sultan Maḥmūd, the great Turkish ruler of the Ghaznavids. The religious policy of this Sultan and his immediate successors must have been very liberal indeed.

It is not out of place to point out that Al-Bīrūnī is one of the keen minds to see the spirit of inquiry inculcated by the Qur’an. He sees a real connection between his objective approach and the demands of the Qur’an in this respect. In the introduction of the India he explains how he tried to save himself from untruth and falsehood by analyzing some psychological motives such as hatred, ignorance, love, etc., which often lead us to conceal the truth. Through God’s mercy, says Al-Bīrūnī, he is afflicted by none of these. He says that “that man alone is praiseworthy who shrinks from a lie and always adheres to the truth, enjoying credit even among liars, not to mention others. It has been said in the Qur’an that one has to speak the truth, even if it were against one’s self”.

According to Al-Bīrūnī, Islam created a living culture-consciousness, as it were, which is free from all sorts of narrow-mindedness. He is fully aware of the rational and inductive spirit of the Qur’an on the one hand, and of the great difficulties caused by the scriptures of some other religions on the other. He says that some Indian scientists in his time misinterpreted the scientific results so as to avoid the probable conflicts between science and religion; and he reproaches them for that.

He has great confidence in his religion and culture—a confidence which is sometimes indispensable for the attainment of a broad frame of

26 Al-Bīrūnī’s India, vol. 2, pp. 31, 250, 269.
mind. "The sentences of the Qur'an," he claims, "which deal with these (the shape of the heaven, earth, etc.) and other subjects necessary for men to know are not such as to require a strained interpretation. . . . They are in perfect harmony with the other religious codes; and at the same time, they are perfectly clear and unambiguous. Besides, the Qur'an does not contain questions which have for ever been the subjects of controversy, . . . such as the question of chronology and the like." Al-Beyrûnî refers again and again to the verse which states "Our Lord, thou did not create all these in vain. . . ." He says that "this noble verse contains the totality of what I have explained in detail."

Al-Beyrûnî was a great lover of knowledge; he emphasized the importance of knowledge for its utility as well as for the sake of perfection of men. 28 For him, knowledge is good as a means and as an end, and there is a clear distinction between the intrinsic worth of a thing and the benefit that it brings in the end. According to Al-Beyrûnî, "it is knowledge in general that is pursued solely by men, and which is pursued for the sake of knowledge itself because its acquisition is truly delightful and is unlike other pleasures derivable from other pursuits." 29 The number of sciences are great, and it may be still greater if the public mind is directed towards them at such times as they are in the ascendancy and general favour with all, when people not only honour Science itself, but also its representatives. To do this is, in the first instance, the duty of those who rule over them."

Al-Beyrûnî was, as has been pointed out, primarily a man of science rather than a philosopher in the technical sense of the term. Nevertheless there is no harm to call him a philosopher, if we take philosophy to mean a rational and disciplined inquiry. It is said that Al-Beyrûnî wrote three philosophical treatises which seem to have been lost. Thus, we can only obtain some clues of his philosophical ideas. He seems to be somewhat critical of Muslim Aristotelianism in many important points such as the idea of the eternity of the world and the like. He believed in creation ex nihilo and said that to believe otherwise is tantamount to the denial of some basic principles of Islam. 30

25 The Determination . . ., p. 8.
In a series of questions and answers with Ibn Sînâ, Al-Beyrûnî touched upon problems of time, matter, motion, and compared his own views with those of Aristotelian philosophers. As we said, he was the first Muslim thinker who had a first-hand knowledge of Indian philosophical and religious thought. He was also quite familiar with Greek and Islamic philosophical literature. He gives some invaluable information about the Brahmanical religion of the people of India, and relates the Indian culture to Islamic and Greek cultures. His comparisons in this respect are very illuminating. In fact, due to his success in this field, some modern scholars consider him as the founder of the discipline of the comparative study of religion. For example, when he explains the Indian idea of immortality and metempsychosis with the corresponding ideas in Greek thought, he gives lengthy quotations from the dialogues of Plato such as *Phaedo*, *Timaeus*, and the *Laws*.

It is interesting to note that Al-Beyrûnî finds a kind of monotheism among the educated Indians. To begin with, he makes a clear distinction between the beliefs of the common men and those of the well-educated. Of the former he says the following: The educated people call God *i'svata*, i.e., self-sufficing, beneficent, who gives without receiving. They consider the unity of God as absolute. The existence of God they consider as a real existence, because of everything that exists through Him. Those who study philosophy or theology and desire abstract truth which they call *sara*, are entirely free from worshipping anything but God alone, and never dream of worshipping an image manufactured to represent Him.

In ethical and political thinking, Al-Beyrûnî tends towards practical solutions rather than theoretical reasoning. In ethics he stresses the importance of two basic virtues: *Muruwwa* and *ukhuwwa*. The first term usually stands for the moral behaviour of the individual, whereas the second stands for the social moral life; the one for "manliness" and the other for communal "brotherhood." It must be remembered that the first term has nothing to do with the show of the brute force. In fact, gentleness (*hilm*), soft-heartedness (*rifk*), and patience are the basic constituent elements of this virtue.

His idea of brotherhood seems to have made him very critical of the old Indian cast system. "Among the Hindus," Al-Beyrûnî says, "Institutions of this kind abound. We Muslims, of course,
stand entirely on the other side of the question, considering all men as equals. ... This is the great obstacle which prevents any approach or understanding between Hindus and Muslims.”

Beyrûnî, as we have said earlier, was a man of science; so, he tried to build a bridge of understanding between different communities by way of scientific appreciation of human culture. However, this was not the only approach. There were other men of insight who tried to do the same thing in a slightly different way. This was the way of the Sûfîs, i.e., of the Muslim mystics whose main aim was the education of “hearts.” Here we will touch upon the views of only two great Turkish Sûfîs: Mawlânâ and Yûnus Emre.

Mawlânâ Jalâluddîn Rûmî (1207-1273), simply called “Mawlânâ” (i.e., Our Master) by the Turkish people, is considered as the “Sultan Philosopher” of Islamic mysticism. He is, indeed, a major peak and a spiritual tower in the tradition of Islamic sufism. His message is now sought not only by his Muslim fellowmen but by millions of people all over the world. He has become the chief spokesman of a philosophy of love both in the East as well as in the West. Mawlânâ showed the Muslims in general and the Muslim Turks in particular, the deepest meaning of the Holy Qur'an, and gave them the values that spring from the purity of heart, and thus made an everlasting impact upon the minds and hearts of millions. His greatest work Mathnawî is considered a kind of commentary upon the Qur'an. Because of the immense depth and value of this work, it has been said that Mawlânâ “is not a prophet but has a Book.”

Mawlânâ is neither a jurist nor a philosopher in the technical sense of the term; nor in fact a mere poet. It is clear that he does not aim at finding a philosophical or theological system, although his moving verses are very important, theologically and philosophically. In the opening lines of his Mathnawî, we find the basic frame of Mawlânâ’s philosophy of life which has a very long history in Islamic religious thought and life. The reed (nay), which represents man’s soul, complains about its being far away from its original and real home. Because of such separation the soul suffers and tries to make itself understood. It mourns and cries because it wants to return to its true home. Only devotion, truthfulness and love can remove the dark curtains between the soul and its source, i.e., God.
Man's happiness consists in this spiritual journey with many steps, each of which is described in terms death and life.

Mawlânâ's description of man's spiritual elevation reminds us of a type of evolutionary idea which has nothing to do with the modern Darwinian theory of evolution. He says:

Dying from the inorganic we developed into the vegetable kingdom. Dying from vegetable we rose to the animal. And leaving the animal, we became men. Then what fear that death will lower us? The next transition will make us angels. From angels we shall rise and become what no mind can conceive; we shall merge in Infinity as in the beginning. Have we not been told "all of us will return unto Him?"

Now, in the act of every growth and development there is love which, according to Mawlânâ, is the secret of life. By virtue of love everything strives incessantly to return to the Source of its being. Through love man attains a very sublime state of consciousness which is far above the realms of senses and theoretical reasoning. Love is the core of the universe, and the ideal person, or what Mawlânâ calls the "Man of Truth," is an embodiment of love which requires not the passive submission but an active participation, assimilation and expansion. Mawlânâ, like many of his great followers, seeks to fortify human personality instead of denying it. Muhammad Iqbâl's philosophy of Self has developed around Mawlânâ's conception of love.

Mawlânâ's philosophy of love is dynamic in nature. Without ignoring the importance of speculation, it heavily relies on effort and struggle without which man's potentialities cannot be realized. No doubt, to defend a dynamic view of love requires the acceptance of the freedom of will. Mawlânâ says this:

It is certain that we possess freedom of the will, You cannot deny the manifest evidence of the inner sense.

This "inner sense of freedom" forces man to be active and creative to such an extent that he becomes the participant of the divine activity. Mawlânâ's free man is not the slave of a fatalistic weltanschauung. Mawlânâ brings about a great change in the concept of
predestination (*takdîr*), which has been very influential in the modern Islamic thought. By *takdîr* Mawlânâ understands “the laws of life,” and God’s eternal wisdom in the universe. And the law of life is endeavour, the lack of which is but death. “Purposeless activity,” says Mawlânâ, “is better than slumber.”

It is the power to contemplate and to act freely that makes man the vicegerent of God. This is beautifully described in the following verses:

So, while in form you are the microcosm,  
In reality you are the macrocosm.  
Eternally the branch is the origin of the fruit,  
Intrinsically the branch came into existence for the sake of the fruit.  
Had there been no hope for the fruit,  
Would the gardener have planted the tree?  
Therefore, in reality the tree is born of the fruit,  
Though it appears to be produced.

The greatness of man comes from a secret link that exists between his inner being and the Lord of creation. This link is a kind of experience which is, in nature, both emotional and cognitive. When man becomes conscious of it, he will be in a position to discover the real meaning of life and death. Then he will be free of worldly fear and anxiety. Mawlânâ combines the idea of death with joy and felicity. Death, for him, is only a transition into the world of light. Death is the arrival of lovers:

Awake, the time has come, awake, awake,  
Without reaching Him, detest yourself, detest yourself.

Mawlânâ wrote in Persian, but most of his ideas and his philosophy of life were repeated by his great follower Yunus Emre (d. 1321) in Turkish. Yunus Emre was the greatest folk poet of the Turkish people. He says:

Since Mawlânâ cast his glance upon us  
His magnificent vision has become the mirror of our hearts.

For Yunus Emre, Mawlânâ was the chief saint of the world, so it was a great joy for him to sing Mawlânâ’s songs in Turkish.
Yunus Emre was amidst his people. He told their stories and shared their happiness and grief. He roamed all over Anatolia step by step and wrote in very simple scheme of rhymes, using the old Turkish art of counting syllables instead of the difficult Arabic-Persian quantitative meters. He was able to express the most difficult religious ideas so simply and in such a fresh and sweet language that even today school-children can understand most of them. His influence is increasing day by day, and his works are being appreciated by many people in so many different lands.